Insurance Regulation: Lessons from a Small Economy by Perry, Ronen
SMU Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 1 Article 10
2010
Insurance Regulation: Lessons from a Small
Economy
Ronen Perry
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronen Perry, Insurance Regulation: Lessons from a Small Economy, 63 SMU L. Rev. 189 (2010)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol63/iss1/10




I. THE REFORM ........................................... 192
A. THE OFFICIAL STORY ................................. 192
B. THE UNTOLD STORY .................................. 195
II. INSURANCE COVERAGE.............................. 201
A . O VERVIEW ............................................ 201
B. THE SCOPE OF COMPENSATION........................ 202
1. Economic Damages ............................... 202
2. Non-Economic Damages .......................... 204
3. The Exclusivity Provision..................... 207
4. The Benefit to Insurance Companies ............... 209
C. COMPENSATION METHOD.............................. 209
1. Interim Payments.................................. 209
2. Periodic Payments ................................. 211
D. AMENDMENT No. 8 ................................... 215
III. THE PREM IUM S ........................................ 219
IV. LESSONS FOR A FEDERAL SYSTEM ................. 229
CO N CLU SION .................................................. 232
INTRODUCTIONIN March 2009, the faltering insurance behemoth AIG sparked na-
tional outrage when it announced a payment of $165 million in execu-
tive bonuses after receiving more than $170 billion in bailout money
from the U.S. Treasury.' President Obama expressed his personal indig-
nation in a public statement, concluding that this situation "underscores
... the need for overall financial regulatory reform, so we don't find
ourselves in this position again, and for some form of resolution mecha-
nism in dealing with troubled financial institutions, so we have greater
* Editor's Note: The SMU Law Review staff typically checks cited material for both
Bluebook form and substance. Parts of this Article rely on sources that are not available in
English. Those sources could not be checked in the traditional law review sense but have
been checked for Bluebook form. Wherever possible, English translations were obtained
and checked. Any quotations from sources unavailable in English are the author's
translation.
** Professor of Law, University of Haifa. I am grateful to Mark Geistfeld and John
Goldberg for inspiring me to write this paper and to Izhak Englard, Israel Gilead, Daniel
More, and Ariel Porat for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After
$170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at Al.
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authority to protect the American taxpayer and our financial system in
cases such as this." 2 Is this merely an anecdote, a unique case that re-
quires a tailored solution, or a symptom of a more fundamental
deficiency?
The recent economic crisis showcased some of the main deficiencies of
existing regulatory systems and rekindled the debate over the importance
and scope of regulation in general and of financial services regulation in
particular. Against this backdrop, insurance-one of the main pillars of
the financial services sector-merits special attention because it remains
the only financial industry in the United States that is not regulated on
the federal level.3 In the landmark case of United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n,4 the Supreme Court held that "[n]o commercial en-
terprise . .. which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to
be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause,"5 and that the insurance business was no exception.6 This opened
the door to federal regulation of the insurance industry. Insurance com-
panies were concerned by the prospect of rigorous federal regulation, and
intensive lobbying began.7 The following year, Congress enacted the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, whereby "the continued regulation . .. by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and . . .
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation . . . of such business by the several States."8
Although many have encouraged Congress to repeal this Act, they have
2. Obama's Statement on A.I.G., N.Y. Times Blog: The Caucus, http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/obamas-statement-on-aig/ (Mar. 16, 2009, 13:45 EST).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN, REGULATING INSURANCE AFTER THE CRISIS 9 (2009),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/-mediafiles/rc/papers/2009/0304_insurance-litah/
0304_insurance litan.pdf ("The state system of insurance regulation contrasts with that of
banks, which can choose their primary regulator (state or federal), mutual funds (federal),
and securities and commodities brokers (primarily federal).").
4. 322 U.S. 553 (1944).
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .").
6. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 553. The Court overruled previous
rulings to the contrary. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495,
510 (1913) ("[C]ontracts of insurance are not commerce at all, neither state nor inter-
state."); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1895) ("The business of insurance is
not commerce."); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (sustaining a Virginia statute
that regulated foreign insurance companies and holding that the statute did not violate the
Commerce Clause because "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce").
7. See, e.g., Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for
Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 590-94 (discussing the insur-
ance industry's reaction to South-Eastern Underwriters); Note, Federal Regulation of Insur-
ance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340, 1341-
42 (same). Unsurprisingly, state regulators also expressed vehement opposition to federal
regulation. See Weller, supra, at 598 (noting that the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners had an "indisputable imprint on the McCarran Act").
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006). The Act provides: (1) that the insurance industry shall be
subject to state regulation and taxation; (2) that "[njo Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede" state laws on these matters; and (3) that even the Sher-
man Act applies to the insurance market only insofar as there is no state antitrust regula-
tion. Id. § 1012.
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been unsuccessful so far.9
This Article unveils the inherent weakness of regulation on the state
level and advocates cautious federal intervention. But unlike previous
studies, this Article uses an interest-group theory with a strong compara-
tive bent. An interest-group theory is premised on the idea that "regula-
tion provides a mechanism through which organized interest groups can
influence the distribution of economic rents in an industry."10 Presuma-
bly, insurance regulation is no different. In addition, the state system of
insurance regulation in the United States makes the use of foreign experi-
ence valuable because, in the absence of federal intervention, individual
states operate much like small foreign economies. The vast foreign expe-
rience, despite its great value to American scholars and policymakers, is
usually inaccessible due to language barriers. This Article aims to lift at
least one barrier and to enrich scholarly and political discourse with
timely and pertinent insights.
The purposes of regulation may vary, but all forms of regulation re-
strain the freedom or power of a certain group in order to secure an over-
riding societal benefit. The subversive yet commonsense view expressed
herein is that the attempt to regulate markets, insurance markets in par-
ticular, may create an environment in which regulated groups are empow-
ered rather than restrained. In trying to regulate insurance markets, the
regulator reduces insurers' incentive to compete and induces them to co-
operate, vis-A-vis the regulator itself, to the detriment of consumers. This
argument can be substantiated using evidence from a foreign economy,
assuming that the lessons taught by others' experience are applicable mu-
tatis mutandis to American markets.
More than three decades ago, the Israeli legislature adopted a revolu-
tionary road accident compensation scheme with an explicit social moti-
vation. The new statutory regime combined drivers' absolute liability for
all personal injuries caused in road accidents with mandatory liability in-
surance.11 The advocates of the reform hoped to attain an efficient and
9. See, e.g., Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson
Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 397, 402-06 (1988) (discussing the effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act on insurance
premiums); Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy After the Reagan Administration, 76 GEO. L.J.
329, 332 (1987) ("[Ojne current controversy in Congress is whether to repeal the McCar-
ran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for the insurance industry."); Charles R. McGuire, Reg-
ulation of the Insurance Industry after Hartford Fire Insurance v. California: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 303, 305 (1994) (dis-
cussing efforts to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act). The Senate Judiciary Committee
recently held a hearing on the subject. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Immu-
nity: Good for Consumers?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 25
(2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110-senate
hearings&docid=f:35166.pdf. Yet the odds of reform are unclear at best.
10. J. David Cummins, Property-Liability Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bas-
tion?, in AEI-BROOKINGs JoINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, DEREGULATING PROP-
ERTY-LIABILTY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET
EFFICIENCY 1, 7 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002).
11. See Izhak Englard, Traffic Accident Victim Compensation in Israel: A Decade of
Experience with No-Fault, in COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES IN SWEDEN AND
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comprehensive compensatory mechanism by resorting to the private in-
surance market, subject to rigorous legislative and administrative regula-
tion. The legislature not only compelled drivers to purchase insurance
compatible with their potential statutory liability, but also collaborated
with the executive branch in determining the particulars of the scheme,
including the extent of coverage and the premium rates. Despite its sin-
cere intentions, however, the government barely controlled the substance
of the new mechanism. Before and after the initial statutory reform, in-
surance companies established a unified front and aggressively negotiated
the "terms" of the scheme with government and parliamentary officials.
They have continued to do so quite successfully for decades.
Part I presents the official social justification for the statutory reform.
It then shows that the insurance companies' greatest achievement is the
government's relinquishment of its original plan, which was supported by
economic and social considerations and recommended by an official com-
mission to provide compensation for road accident victims through a na-
tional insurance system. This, however, was only their first political
achievement. Part II shows that throughout the "regulation era," insur-
ance companies impelled the legislature to restrict and gradually reduce
their financial risk. For instance, damages for economic and non-eco-
nomic losses under the statutory regime were capped, and the caps were
subsequently lowered, while victims were deprived of their traditional
rights of action in torts. Part III shows that during the same period, insur-
ance companies exerted considerable pressure on the government
through their representative union to steadily increase premium rates
without a true economic justification. Part IV extracts valuable lessons
for American scholars and policymakers from the Israeli experience.
I. THE REFORM
A. THE OFFICIAL STORY
On September 25, 1976, the Israeli Road Accident Victims Compensa-
tion Act (RAVCA or the Act) came into force.12 The official motive for
its enactment was social. 13 According to the traditional view, the Act was
meant to guarantee a prompt and efficacious remedy for all victims of
OTHER COUNTRIES 154, 157 (Carl Oldertz & Eva Tidefet eds., 1988) [hereinafter Englard,
A Decade of Experience].
12. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act, 1975, S.H. [Sefer HaHukim] 234.
13. See, e.g., CLA 9121/00 Levi v. Menorah Ins. Co. [20031 IsrSC 57(5) 337, 348; CA
2856/00 Shkoy v. Hadar Ins. Co. [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 518, 520; CA 2199/99 Estate of Oded
Lazar v. Port & Ry. Auth. [2001] IsrSC 56(1) 938, 958 (Strasberg-Cohen J., concurring);
CLA 4231/97 Tzur Shamir Ins. Co. v. Nad [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 193, 200; CLA 2853/96 Karnit
v. Perach [1999] IsrSC 53(1) 680, 690-91; CA 91/82 Goldman v. HaSne Ins. Co. [19841
IsrSC 38(3) 505, 517-18; ELIEZER RiVuIN, ROAD AccIDENTS: PROCEDURE AND COMPUTA-
nON OF DAMAGEs 4 (3rd ed. 2000) ("The Act .. . reflects the victory of the social percep-
tion, aiming to translate society's moral duty to care for road accident victims . . . into a
proper legal regime."); Daniel More, The Deterrence Factor in the Battle Against Road
Accidents, in LOWENBERG FESTSCHRiwr 257, 287 (1988) ("[T]he common view is that this is
a social Act, intended to provide compensation to any road accident victim.").
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road accidents. During the discussion that preceded the second and third
readings of the Bill, several Knesset members explained that before the
Act, many road accident victims were left without compensation. The
main goal of the Act was to change this reality, and guarantee proper
compensation to all victims. 1 4 In one of the first cases wherein the Su-
preme Court was required to interpret the provisions of the Act, Justice
Barak opined that "the clear purpose of the Act is to impose liability-
and a duty to insure against such liability-for any personal injury caused
by the use of motor vehicles."15 Since then, the idea of "compensation to
any victim" has dominated the legal and extra-legal discourse about com-
pensation for road accident victims. 16 Another purpose, also derived
from the supreme social goal, was to expedite the process whereby a vic-
tim received compensation. The Act was intended to provide a prompt
remedy by curtailing the wearisome process characteristic of fault-based
liability regimes.17 Put differently, the goal of RAVCA was to guarantee
proper-and prompt-compensation to any victim.
The legislature sought to achieve this goal through a threefold reform.
First, RAVCA imposes absolute liability on any person using a motor
vehicle for personal injuries caused to others "in road accidents in which
the vehicle is involved." 8 Absolute liability is more extensive than strict
liability because it is not only independent of the defendant's fault or lack
thereof, but also unaffected by the victim's contributory negligence. 19
The abolition of fault theoretically guarantees compensation to any vic-
tim of a road accident and expedites compensation by reducing the num-
ber and complexity of legal disputes.
Second, RAVCA amended the Motor Vehicle Insurance Ordinance. 20
Prior to 1976, the Ordinance provided that a person would not use or
14. DK [Divrei HaKnesset] (1975) 3955, 3956 (statement of the chair of the Constitu-
tion, Law, and Justice Committee, Zerach Warhaftig); id. at 3959 (statement of the Minis-
ter of Justice, Chaim Zadok); DK (1973) 4007 (statement of MK Chaim Zadok); id. at 4015
(statement of MK Moshe Nissim); IZHAK ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICnM COMPENSA-
TION 4 (2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICnM COMPENSATIONI;
Izhak Englard, The Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 5 HEB. U. L.J. 431, 433
(1974) [hereinafter Englard, The Bill].
15. CA 133/79 Buchman v. Alnassara [1980] IsrSC 35(2) 64, 67.
16. See, e.g., CLA 3339/00 Eliahu Ins. Co. v. Dahan [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 503, 510-11; CA
483/84 Karnit v. Avraham [1987] IsrSC 41(4) 754,761; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT 7, 7 (1991)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT]; Anat Reitblatt, Private Insurance of
National Insurance: The Insurance Companies' Impact, 35 INs. ISR. 26 (1977); Galia Shilo,
A Social Act Cannot Prevail Under Competition, 83 INs. BROKER 6, 6 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Karnit, IsrSC 41(4) at 761; DK (1975) 3954, 3962 (statement of MK Zer-
ach Warhaftig); DK (1973) 4007 (statement of MK Chaim Zadok); RivLIN, supra note 13,
at 3, 36; Reitblatt, supra note 16, at 26; Katya Schwartzman, The Right of Reimbursement
Under the Road Accident Victims Compensation Act, 212 INs. ISR. 35, 36 (1994).
18. Englard, A Decade of Experience, supra note 11, at 157.
19. See id. at 158. The Act provides, however, that a person is not entitled to compen-
sation if that person intentionally caused the accident. Road Accident Victims Compensa-
tion Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 7(1).




allow another to use a motor vehicle without having an insurance policy
that covered the user's liability for death or injury caused to third parties
by the use of the vehicle. 21 RAVCA made two significant changes to this
provision. First, it added-probably for the sake of clarity-that an in-
surance policy under the Ordinance must cover any liability under
RAVCA itself.2 2 More importantly, it added that a policy under the Or-
dinance must insure the vehicle's user against any personal injury he or
she might incur while using the vehicle (first-party insurance).23 Ex-
panding mandatory insurance guarantees that a road accident victim will
be able to recover for his or her losses and will not be left with only a
forlorn hope of recovery due to the defendant's insolvency. This could
also expedite recovery because insurance companies are not expected to
delay payments like an average defendant.
Third, RAVCA established the Road Accident Victims Compensation
Fund, commonly known as "Karnit."24 Karnit is a government corpora-
tion 25 that primarily compensates road accident victims who are entitled
to compensation under the Act but cannot recover from an insurance
company because the user of the motor vehicle involved in the accident
(1) is unknown (as in a hit-and-run accident), (2) does not have liability
insurance, or (3) is covered by an insolvent insurer.26 Put differently,
Karnit serves a secondary or complementary role in the compensation
scheme.
The abolition of fault, the expansion of mandatory insurance, and the
establishment of Karnit were intended to guarantee proper and prompt
compensation to all road accident victims. Moreover, the costs of the
scheme were to be spread among all drivers. The wide burden distribu-
tion accords with the social goal of the reform.27 RAVCA also intro-
duced many procedural innovations intended to simplify and shorten the
legal process.28 Lastly, to aid the victim and avoid undue pressure to
compromise, the legislature empowered the victim to demand interim
payments to cover medical expenses and cost of living during the legal
process.29
21. Id. § 2-3.
22. Id. § 18(4)(a)(1).
23. See also id. § 18(4)(a)(2); ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIM COMPENSATION,
supra note 14, at 5.
24. RAVCA §§ 10-15.
25. Id. § 11.
26. Id. § 12(a)(1)-(3); see also IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16,
at 8. In other countries that have adopted strict liability with mandatory liability insurance
regimes, cases in which victims were entitled to compensation but unable to recover from
an insurance company were resolved in a similar manner. See, e.g., B.S. MARKESINIS, THE
GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: THE LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION
712-13 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the German road accident scheme).
27. DK (1975) 3955.
28. For instance, only one medical expert, who is appointed by the court, is allowed to
testify at trial. RAVCA § 6A.
29. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
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B. THE UNTOLD STORY
As explained above, RAVCA purported to serve a social goal. It was
supposed to provide road accident victims with a prompt and efficacious
remedy based on individual need rather than personal fault. Its underly-
ing conception is of collective responsibility for the materialization of
risks that every person is exposed to and that nearly every person creates
in everyday life. But if the reform was motivated by a social goal, the
choice of a legal regime based on personal liability and mandatory liabil-
ity insurance is puzzling. Arguably, placing the treatment of road acci-
dent victims within the purview of the National Insurance Institute (NII)
would more fully realize that goal. This is so mainly because of the inher-
ent discord between the social goal of protecting victims and insurance
companies' commercial motivation.30 The NII's approach is naturally
geared towards social protection, whereas insurance companies are com-
mercial entities motivated primarily by profit. Maximizing profit is, of
course, a legitimate aspiration, but it is likely to frustrate the social goal.
First, private insurance companies have a clear interest in delaying pay-
ment and reducing the amounts paid and, for these reasons, may wage
exhausting legal battles against victims.3 1 Ideally, this phenomenon
should not characterize the NII, which exists and operates to promote
victims' interests. Unsurprisingly, the waiting period for decisions in
claims filed with the NII by work accident victims is significantly shorter
than that for road accident victims awaiting the resolution of actions filed
pursuant to RAVCA. According to a 1991 governmental report, the han-
dling time of workers' compensation claims by the NI averaged 1.6
months for hired workers and 2.1 months for the self-employed. 32 In con-
trast, litigation under RAVCA may endure for years.33
Second, a socially oriented statutory reform should fix victims' medical
and vocational rehabilitation as one of its central goals. Efficient medical
and vocational rehabilitation requires ongoing (not just one-time) atten-
tion to every victim, counseling and other rehabilitative services (not just
financial aid), and initiatives on the part of the responsible body. Com-
mercial entities will not take an interest in the fate of each individual
victim beyond their narrow financial obligations and, therefore, cannot be
made responsible for realizing this social goal.3 4 The Nil, on the other
30. See DK (1973) 4003 (statement of MK Reuven Arazi); IMPLEMENTATION COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 71; IZHAK ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIMS COMPEN-
SATION SCHEME: PRINCIPLES FOR A PROPOSED REFORM 36 (1972) [hereinafter ENGLARD,
PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM]; Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 434-35; cf. J. David Cum-
mins, What's Driving Auto Insurance Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1989, at 1 ("[I]t is increas-
ingly difficult to reconcile the social role of auto insurance with its provision through the
private-insurance industry.").
31. See IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 72.
32. Id. at 73-74.
33. See Ronen Perry, A Misrepresented Reform: The Story of the Road Accident Vic-
tims Compensation Act, 28 TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 147, 168-71 (2004).
34. Monetary compensation alone does not guarantee optimal rehabilitation. The vic-
tim is frequently unaware of the available methods of rehabilitation and is unqualified, and
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hand, has skilled and experienced personnel who can actively accompany
and assist the victim through the rehabilitation process. This is a signifi-
cant advantage.35 Unsurprisingly, victims of road accidents that occurred
in the course of work that were treated by the NII returned to work much
faster than victims of other road accidents who had only a financial claim
against an insurance company.36
Furthermore, were the treatment of road accident victims transferred
to the NII, the social cost of the scheme would be significantly lower than
that of the existing regime. First, the operating costs of a national insur-
ance compensation scheme are generally lower than those of a private
insurance compensation scheme. Implementation costs of RAVCA in-
clude, inter alia, insurance companies' administration costs, brokerage
and advertising expenditures, litigation and settlement costs (incurred by
insurers and victims), and reinsurance costs. Transferring the processing
of road accident victims to the NIL would save brokerage, advertising,
and reinsurance costs, as well as a significant portion of the total cost of
litigation and settlement that characterizes the existing regime. A num-
ber of studies conducted at different times indicate that out of the NII's
total financial outlay in handling work accident cases, operating costs
constitute only 5%-7%, and the balance (93%-95%) goes straight into
the victims' pockets. In contrast, of the total expenses incurred by insur-
ance companies in handling road accident cases under RAVCA, operat-
ing costs (including victims' legal expenses) constitute 35%-46%.37
Moreover, transferring the treatment of road accident victims to the NII
would result in a considerable increase in the number of victims handled
by the NII. This would arguably reduce operating costs as a percentage
of total expenses due to economies of scale. Thus far, this Article has
only compared the positive outlays associated with the two schemes. One
should keep in mind, however, that the cost of implementing RAVCA
also includes a certain profit for insurers, whereas the cost of implement-
ing a national insurance scheme does not include this component.
Transferring road accident cases to the NII would also reduce the total
cost of treating victims of road accidents that occurred in the course of
work. At present, victims of dual accidents-namely those occurrences
classified as work accidents and road accidents-can sue both the NII and
thus often unable, to choose the best course of action. Moreover, private service providers
from which the victim may seek help are primarily concerned about their profit, and not
victims' well-being.
35. See IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 79; Englard, The
Bill, supra note 14, at 434-35; Yehuda Kahana, The Costs of the Road Accident Victims'
Compensation Act, 23 ISR. ECON. Q. 370, 376 (1976-77) [hereinafter Kahana, The Costs of
RAVCA]; Reitblatt, supra note 16, at 26. Note that the NIH currently provides vocational
rehabilitation services, but outsources medical rehabilitation.
36. See Yehuda Kahana, Road Accident Victims' Insurance-Through the National In-
surance Institute?, 25 ISR. ECON. Q. 74, 79, 85 (1978-79) [hereinafter Kahana, National
Insurance Institute].
37. See IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 73, 78; Kahana, Na-
tional Insurance Institute, supra note 36, at 79-81; cf. Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at
435 (discussing several jurisdictions in the United States).
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the insurer of the car involved in the accident. Victims of dual accidents
are dealt with twice by two separate entities. The marginal contribution
of RAVCA to the well-being of such a victim is usually negligible because
all payments from the NII are deducted from the victim's entitlement
under RAVCA.38 Undeniably, the abolition of this duality would consid-
erably reduce the social cost of treating this type of victims. Moreover,
"nationalizing" the treatment of road accident victims would save on the
reciprocal accounting between the NII and private insurance companies
in cases of dual accidents. The rate of dual-accident victims among road-
accident victims has ranged between 15% and 25% over the years.39 It
follows, then, that transferring the treatment of road accident victims to
the NII could significantly reduce the social cost of the compensation
scheme.
The legislature was aware of the advantages of a national compensa-
tion and rehabilitation scheme when RAVCA was enacted.40 Indeed, the
first official proposal for the regulation of road accident victims' compen-
sation, drafted by the Ben Ze'ev Committee in 1966, contemplated an
extension of the existing workers' compensation scheme, operated by the
NII, to road accident victims, thereby equalizing the rights of the latter to
those of the former.41 However, insurance companies adamantly op-
38. Occasionally, it transpires that the scope of damages under RAVCA is lower than
the expected payments from the NII, and the claim is denied. In a case like this, the weari-
some process is ultimately futile.
39. See IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 74, 78; Kahana, Na-
tional Insurance Institute, supra note 36, at 75-76; Kahana, The Costs of RAVCA, supra
note 35, at 376.
40. Izhak Englard questioned the superiority of a national insurance scheme. See gen-
erally Englard, A Decade of Experience, supra note 11. But Englard's reasons seem unper-
suasive. His main argument is that funds collected by the NII were used by the government
in pursuit of general objectives unrelated to the specific goals of social insurance. Id. at
165. He added that "nationalization" of the auto insurance business would enable the
government to obtain funding for other activities. Id. This argument is problematic. Even if
Englard's assumption that the government uses NII funds to attain goals that are unrelated
to social insurance is accepted, it does not follow that private insurance better serves the
interests of road accident victims than national insurance. The flaw is not in the method
itself, but in its implementation. This flaw could (and should) be overcome by setting strict
criteria for the use of NII funds and by reinforcing supervision of those funds. Private
insurance companies also use a significant part of the money they collect for purposes
unrelated to compensation (for example, brokerage fees, general management costs, ad-
vertising, and profit). Englard's second argument is that transferring the treatment of road
accident victims to the Nil would reduce the amount of damages victims receive because
their rights would be equalized with those of work accident victims. Id. This concern is
addressed below. See infra note 50. The NII is obviously not without flaws. The basic
argument is that, on the abstract level, social protection should be provided via a national
mechanism, and not through private firms. The flaws inherent in social mechanisms argua-
bly are not inevitable and can be repaired.
41. See Inter-Ministerial Committee Report on Questions of Traffic and Work Acci-
dents, 1 ISR. L. REV. 636, 654-55 (1966). Accordingly, the Committee recommended the
abolition of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Ordinance [New Version]. Id. at 649. The Com-
mittee was appointed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Labor in 1964. The
report follows an informal proposal set out in Uri Yadin, Outline of an Automobile Com-
pensation Plan for Israel, 13 Am. J. CoMP. L. 276 (1964).
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posed that proposal, which was consequently shelved for several years.42
The idea of social insurance for road accident victims resurfaced in 1971
in a Ministry of Justice memorandum introducing a bill to provide bene-
fits to road accident victims. 4 3 Izhak Englard, the author of a renowned
commentary on RAVCA, wrote that deliberations over the proposal were
conducted behind closed doors and that the public "only heard rumors
about fierce hostility of various circles, most notably commercial insur-
ance companies, which yet again opposed what they referred to as the
'nationalization' of the auto insurance business." 44 In the spring of 1973,
the Ministry of Justice circulated a new memorandum, which was sub-
stantively different from its predecessor. According to the new docu-
ment, commercial insurance companies were at the center of the road-
accident victims compensation scheme. Persistent rumors suggested that
the change was a result of covert negotiations with insurance companies,
but these rumors were accorded no official confirmation. 45 The Ministry
of Justice did not conduct any public debate before deciding to deviate
from the original plan and never actually explained the surprising change
in its policy. 4 6
During the Knesset deliberations on the draft proposal, a few members
of Knesset were somewhat surprised that the ultimate proposal was not
based on the original concept of social insurance. 47 But there was no
serious response to these queries. Prior to the second and third readings,
the chair of the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee suc-
cinctly stated: "[I]n the course of the committee's deliberations we also
examined the feasibility and utility of transferring the treatment of and
42. See Englard, A Decade of Experience, supra note 11, at 157; Englard, The Bill,
supra note 14, at 431 n.4.
43. See ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIM COMPENSATION supra note 14, at 1; EN-
GLARD, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM, supra note 30, at 35, App. 5; Englard, The Bill, supra
note 14, at 431.
44. Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 431; see also Englard, A Decade of Experience,
supra note 11, at 157.
45. At this stage, the insurance companies were supported by the Israel Bar Associa-
tion, which was concerned about the impact of abolishing fault-based liability on Israeli
lawyers' earnings. See Eli Salzberger, The Israeli Jurists' Conspiracy: On the Israeli Bar and
Its Allies, 32 HEB. U. L.J. 45, 68 n.115 (2001). Salzberger probably overestimates the Bar's
role in the dramatic shift from the original plan. Insurance companies played the key role
here. When conflicts of interests arose between the insurance companies and the Bar, the
insurance lobby always prevailed, and the Bar's attempt to promote its members' interests
attracted fierce criticism. See, e.g., DK (1973) 4010 (statement of MK Ari Ankorion); id. at
4014 (statement of MK Uri Avneri).
46. See Meir D. Cohen, The Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 5 HEB. U. L.J.
3, 3 (1973); Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 431-32; Reitblatt, supra note 16, at 28-29.
The change cannot be attributed to the NII's reluctance to treat road accident victims. On
the contrary, the NI has consistently expressed its willingness to do so. See IMPLEMENTA-
TION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 23, 79.
47. See, e.g., DK (1973) 4003 (statement of MK Reuven Arazi) ("Mr. Minister, I have
listened to the reasons for your change of opinion about transferring this matter to the NII.
I think that the reasons in favor of the original proposal outweigh the reasons against it.
Why did we accept this method for compensating victims of work accidents, and we cannot
accept it for compensating road accident victims? What is the difference?"); DK (1975)
3959-50 (statement of MK Nissim Eliad).
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responsibility for insurance against road accidents to the National Insur-
ance Institute," but "the committee felt that this branch of insurance
should be left with the insurance companies in the hope that they would
invest the necessary effort to warrant the trust and credit given to them
by the public." 48 The Bill was approved on July 29, 1975, and this practi-
cally spelled an end to the debate. Feeble expressions of support for the
Ben Ze'ev Committee's original proposal are occasionally heard,49 but
the frequency and resonance of these voices have progressively
diminished.
After the conclusion of the legislative process, several functionaries
with questionable objectivity endeavored to justify the substantive
change in the government's position between 1971 and 1973, but the rea-
sons given were contrived and patently unconvincing.50 Arguably, the
48. DK (1975) 3955.
49. See, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 71 (explaining
that a serious social problem should be handled by a national institute, rather than private
entities, and stating, "if this has not been done so far, it is only because of the steadfast
opposition of strong interested parties that prevented the transfer of road accidents to the
NII").
50. See, e.g., Interview of the Month with Dr. Jacob Picker: We Were Not Proved
Wrong, 16 INS. ISR. 16, 17 (1976). Both the interviewee (the Israeli insurance commis-
sioner) and the forum (the journal of the Israeli insurance industry) are obviously not
objective. The interviewer, or the editor, explained at the outset: "[The commissioner] had
to withstand the public pressures, again-about the nationalization of auto insurance, and
answer professional questions that only experts can examine thoroughly. He was the insur-
ance companies' 'defender."' Id. at 16. On the subject in question, Dr. Picker's arguments
seem unconvincing.
His first argument is that "the government should not engage in activities that can be
performed by non-national entities." See also Peretz Gordon, We Should Not Nationalize
Mandatory Auto Insurance, 131 INS. ISR. 18, 19 (1986). But even if this were an accurate
presentation of governmental policy in the 1970s, it is clear that privatization policy applies
only where efficiency is the primary concern, and privatization actually enhances effi-
ciency. In this case, social security, and not efficiency is the primary goal, and as explained
above, the national scheme might be more efficient. Dr. Picker's second argument is that
"we should avoid public dependence on and friction with another national mechanism."
However, dependence on, and friction with, a national mechanism were replaced by de-
pendence on, and friction with, private entities. There is no reason to assume that the
dependence and the friction are less significant in the case of private insurance. In fact,
insurance companies' aspirations to increase profitability might create more friction. Dr.
Picker's third argument is that "it is doubtful that a national regime is more cost-effective
and socially beneficial." These arguments are addressed above. See supra notes 30-39 and
accompanying text. Dr. Picker's fourth argument is that, while RAVCA contains a few
social security features, it basically creates a private insurance scheme. Put differently, the
Act is not "social" in any way, so there is no reason to let a social institute take it over. See
Gordon, supra, at 19. But the reform was indeed motivated by a social goal. If it does not
truly achieve this goal, then it should be amended or replaced. Moreover, the adherents of
national insurance contemplated an alternative scheme. They did not think that the NII
should implement RAVCA instead of the private insurance companies. Dr. Picker's last
argument is that transferring the treatment of road accident victims to the NII would entail
one of two things: increasing the amount payable under the National Insurance Act so that
all accident victims would be compensated in accordance with the standards set by
RAVCA or reducing the amount payable to road accident victims so that their rights
would be equalized with those of work accident victims under the National Insurance Act.
The answer is quite simple: If the distinction between work accident victims and road acci-
dent victims is justified, it can be preserved within the NII (after all, the NII already han-
dles various types of claims and claimants). If, on the other hand, the distinction is not
2010] 199
SMU LAW REVIEW
fact that the principal beneficiaries of the sudden transition were insur-
ance companies leaves no room for doubt. Insurance companies' interest
in the non-nationalization of the auto insurance business was, and re-
mains, undisputed.
First, premiums paid by the insured in the private sector include a com-
ponent of insurer-profit, in addition to the other components, which re-
flect expected payments to the insured and administrative costs.5 ' If the
treatment of road accident victims were transferred to the NII, private
insurance companies would lose a significant source of profit. During the
pre-enactment negotiations, insurance companies quite naturally de-
manded that a certain level of profit be assured following the enactment
of RAVCA.52 Their persistence on this matter deserves special attention
because in the pre-enactment debates, their representatives consistently
claimed that mandatory road accident insurance was an unprofitable bus-
iness and that they were interested in it only because they could not
maintain other branches of insurance without it." I speculate that the
"unprofitable business" claim was intended to present insurance compa-
nies in a favorable light to legislators with social aspirations (as if to say,
"We do not make profit on the backs of the insured") and to deter repre-
sentatives of the State, in particular those of the NII, from taking over the
"loss-making" business. Furthermore, the "unprofitable business" claim
was arguably inconsistent with the pre-enactment reality.54 At any rate,
since the enactment of RAVCA, insurance companies have actually
maintained profitability in auto insurance.
Second, insurance companies can profit immensely by investing the
money they receive from the insured during the interval between collect-
ing premiums and paying claims relating to those premiums.55 For in-
stance, in 2002, Israeli insurance companies collected mandatory
insurance premiums totaling New Israeli Shekel (NIS) 3.6 billion,
whereas only NIS 93 million was actually paid out for accidents that oc-
curred during that year, with additional payments of NIS 3.2 billion ex-
justified, equalizing the rights of the two types of victims is not a real problem. It is
warranted.
51. Insurance companies do not always profit from a specific policy, but the expected
profit from a certain category of insurance is generally positive, either because premiums
exceed payments and operating costs or because insurance companies obtain other advan-
tages from selling this type of insurance.
52. See D. Hachami, The Road Accident Victims Act: The Insurance Companies' Posi-
tion, 7 INS. ISR. 6, 7 (1975).
53. DK (1978) 744 (statement of MK Zerach Warhaftig); Hachami, supra note 52, at 7;
Reitblatt, supra note 16, at 28.
54. See, e.g., DK (1978) 746 (statement of MK Shulait Aloni) ("Insurance companies
argue that they are not enriched at the public's expense: Gentlemen, these arguments, and
their fear of transferring the subject to the NII, are the best evidence that they are not
losing money. If they truly lost, they would be willing to transfer this activity to the NII.").
55. See DK (1978) 743; Kahana, National Insurance Institute, supra note 36, at 83 n.34;
Kahana, The Costs of RAVCA, supra note 35, at 375.
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pected in subsequent years.5 6 Third, the mandatory insurance branch
serves as a lever for marketing other products (such as comprehensive
auto insurance).57 Fourth, the significant size of the mandatory auto in-
surance market58 gives insurance companies additional advantages in
their daily business activities. For example, it may reduce the average
administrative cost per insured in all branches of insurance or enable in-
surance companies to obtain favorable financing terms.
In view of all this, insurance companies' steadfast opposition to the
original plan of the Ministry of Justice is quite understandable. It is
equally understandable why insurance companies waged their war against
the "evil decree" far from the public eye. After all, the ultimate decision
to relinquish the "nationalization" plan, made under pressure from the
private insurance industry, was detrimental to the public. It is more diffi-
cult to understand why other parties involved in the legislative process
played down these pressures. At any rate, the abandonment of the idea
of national insurance for road accident victims is probably the most sig-
nificant political achievement of Israeli insurance companies since the es-
tablishment of Israel in 1948, and the evident success in downplaying this




The principal political achievement of the insurance industry was the
relinquishment of the original plan to transfer the treatment of road acci-
dent victims to the NII, despite the clear advantage of such an arrange-
ment (at least from a social policy perspective). Nonetheless, the
fingerprints of insurance companies are also discernible in the concrete
provisions of RAVCA. It is clear that not all of the provisions that bene-
fit the insurance companies were adopted exclusively as a result of their
lobbying, but it is also clear that their intense involvement at all stages of
the legislative process contributed considerably to the formulation of the
Act. Some of the features presented below already appeared in the Bill
of 1973, which was the product of covert negotiations between insurance
companies' representatives and government officials.59 Others were ad-
ded by the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, after it repeatedly
hosted and heard insurance companies' representatives. 60 Finally, insur-
56. See Memorandum from Yehuda Kahana on Evaluation of Pending Claims in 2002:
Mandatory Insurance (2003), available at http://ozar.mof.gov.il/hon/2001/insurance/memos/
dochRechevChova2002.pdf.
57. See Kahana, National Insurance Institute, supra note 36, at 83 n.34.
58. Revenues from this segment were NIS 3.8 billion in 2001, more than 25% of Israeli
insurance companies' revenues. CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 53 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF ISRAEL tbl. 25.4 (2002), available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/archive/shnaton53/st25_04.pdf.
59. See Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 431-32.
60. DK (1975) 3953, 3958-59, 3964.
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ance companies gradually attained other notable achievements through
subsequent amendments of the Act.
B. THE SCOPE OF COMPENSATION
1. Economic Damages
One clear advantage that RAVCA conferred on insurance companies
pertains to the amount of compensation payable to a road accident vic-
tim. The Act subjected both economic and non-economic damages to
rigid caps that did not previously exist.61 On the economic level, a rela-
tively "reasonable" cap was initially set. In calculating the loss of earn-
ings and earning capacity, monthly income in excess of three times the
average wage ("the Maximum Income") must be disregarded. 62 And if
the ratio of the actual loss of earnings to the pre-accident earnings is
lower than 100%, damages must be calculated by multiplying the Maxi-
mum Income by the same ratio.6 3 It should be emphasized that a cause
of action under RAVCA is exclusive. 64 It supplants, rather than supple-
ments, any cause of action under traditional tort law.6 5 So while a high-
income individual injured in a work accident can bring an action in tort to
supplement the limited sum awarded by the NII for loss of earning capac-
ity, a similar person injured in a negligently caused road accident must be
satisfied with the partial compensation awarded by an insurance company
under RAVCA. Establishing an arbitrary cap on economic damages
seems repugnant to an American sense of justice, especially in the para-
digmatic case of a road accident in which a negligent driver injures inno-
cent pedestrians or passengers. Under these circumstances, the legal
system should arguably award the victim full compensation for the loss.
The drafters of the Act claimed that those who find the statutory com-
pensation insufficient, such as a famous violinist or a surgeon who sus-
tains serious economic loss following a hand injury, can easily purchase
first-party insurance that supplements the statutory compensation
schemes. 66 The Minister of Justice emphasized that "the premium in
these cases is rather low." 6 7 In the same breath, the drafters argued that
without a cap, the auto insurance premium would increase substantially.68
But these arguments are contradictory. If the cost of insurance against
economic loss not covered by RAVCA is "rather low" when borne by
relatively few high-income individuals, how can it become burdensome
when spread among all car owners? 69
61. See Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 4(a).
62. Id. § 4(a)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 8.
65. See id.
66. See DK (1975) 3957; DK (1973) 4002, 4011, 4020; see also Road Accident Victims
Compensation Bill, 1973, HH [Hazaot Hok], 406, 408.
67. DK (1973) 4002, 4020.
68. DK (1975) 3956; DK (1973) 4002; Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 434.
69. Cf. Englard, The Bill, supra note 14, at 434.
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Furthermore, under Israeli law, the general rule for assessing damages
for loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity is that the basis must be
gross (pre-tax) income,70 although lump sum compensation is exempt
from tax.71 Yet the Bill of 1973 provided that "in assessing the compensa-
tion for loss of earning capacity, income tax must be deducted, but if com-
pensation is capitalized, the deduction shall not exceed 15% of the
capitalized value of the loss of earning capacity."72 The Knesset's Consti-
tution, Law, and Justice Committee did not endorse this provision. It
held that the cap on damages for loss of earning capacity was sufficient,
that "deduction of income tax would constitute an additional, unjustified
restriction," and that the proposed limit on deduction "might be unfair to
low income victims, compared to high income victims." 73 Consequently,
the first version of RAVCA did not include a provision regarding tax de-
duction. Damage assessment was therefore based on gross income, in
accordance with the general rule of Israeli common law.
However, the insurance industry exerted considerable pressure on the
government, claiming that without a substantial cutback in victims' com-
pensation, a significant increase in premiums would be inevitable. 74 In
consequence, only fifteen months after coming into force, RAVCA was
amended.75 The following provision was added: "[I]f the said compensa-
tion [for loss of earnings and earning capacity] is exempt from income
tax, the victim's losses shall . . . be determined in accordance with the
victim's after-tax income; provided that the deduction in respect of tax
shall not exceed 25% of the lost income."76 This Article does not discuss
the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of this evaluation method.77
It is, however, important to understand that in the wake of the amend-
ment, a significant gap emerged between the economic damages payable
to the victim of a traditional tort and the amount payable to a road acci-
dent victim under RAVCA. Member of Knesset (MK) Dov Shilansky
briefly stated that members of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Com-
mittee were concerned that insurance companies would become even
richer following this amendment and that "this unease was not allayed in
the course of the deliberations."7 8 Despite this concern, only two weeks
passed between the first reading and the final approval of the amendment
70. CA 650/78 Khalif v. Israel [1981] IsrSC 35(2) 242, 247-51; CA 81/55 Kokhavi v.
Becker [1957] IsrSC 11(1) 225, 235-37; CA 70/52 Grossman v. Rott [1952] IsrSC 6(3) 1242,
1251-53. The Israeli Supreme Court adhered to its ruling in Grossman despite the shift to
the after-tax method in England. See British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185
(N.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
71. Income Tax Ordinance [New Version], 1961, N.H. 120, § 9(7).
72. Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 1973, HH, 406, § 4(a)(2).
73. DK (1975) 3953.
74. Protocols of Knesset Proceedings, 38 INs. ISR. 9-10, 27 (1978).
75. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (Amendment), 1978, S.H. 49.
76. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 4(a)(2).
77. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, EcoNovuc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 143-44
(1987) (arguing that "the injurer's liability should be based on the victim's pretax losses in
earnings rather than on his after-tax losses").
78. DK (1978) 743, 918.
2010] 203
SMU LAW REVIEW
on the second and third readings. The fact that the amendment was en-
acted with such haste, before the ink had even dried on the first version
of RAVCA and before its economic implications were sufficiently under-
stood,79 seems to indicate the effectiveness of the pressure applied by the
insurance industry.
Finally, it bears mentioning that, although the amendment significantly
reduced the extent of economic damages payable to a road accident vic-
tim, it is not clear that the reductions will end there. The experience of
other legal systems that have adopted similar compensation schemes
shows that the insurance industry might pursue, overtly or covertly, fur-
ther reductions in damages for loss of earning and earning capacity80 as
well as damages limitations for other economic losses (such as medical
expenses, rehabilitation services, custodial care, etc.).81
2. Non-Economic Damages
An equally important restriction pertains to non-economic damages.
The Bill provided that "compensation for non-pecuniary loss shall not
exceed thirty thousand Israeli pounds [IL]," 82 although damages for pain
and suffering in ordinary tort cases reached IL 75,000 at that time. 83 The
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee understood that it was impossi-
ble to place such a low cap on non-economic damages and decided to
submit two versions for vote in the second reading. The first version set
an IL 75,000 cap, and the other set an IL 100,000 cap. Each version was
supported by an equal number of committee members.84 At first glance,
this might seem like a fair proposal. Alas, more than two years passed
between the first reading (July 17, 1973) and the approval of RAVCA on
second and third readings (July 29, 1975). During that interval, the con-
sumer price index rose by about 90%. So in real terms, the first version
proposed by the Committee (IL 75,000) was higher than the original pro-
posal (IL 30,000 * 1.9 = IL 57,000) by only 30%. More importantly, by
that time, damages for pain and suffering in ordinary torts claims could
run as high as IL 150,000,85 50% more than the second version and ap-
79. Insurance companies collected 815 million Israeli pounds before incurring any ex-
pense or obligation. DK (1978) 746.
80. See generally Bruce Feldthusen, Have the Politics of Rate Regulation Produced a
Better No-Fault Regime for Ontario?, 39 LES CAHIERS DE DROrT 473, 478 (1998) ("The
basic rule for quantifying income replacement is that the plan will pay 80% of the victim's
pre-accident after tax earnings to a maximum of $400. This is a decrease from 90% of net
weekly income to a maximum of $1,000 under Bill 164, and 80% of gross earnings under
the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan."). Apparently, there was another attempt to reduce
the cap on economic damages under RAVCA shortly after it came into force. Deputy
Minister of Finance Yehezkel Flomin said that "we did not see fit to return to the proposal
to set the cap on damages for loss of earnings at twice the average wage." DK (1978) 740.
81. See, e.g., Feldthusen, supra note 80, at 482 (explaining that medical, rehabilitation,
and attendant care benefits under the Ontario no-fault auto insurance scheme are capped).
82. Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 1973, HH, 406, § 4(a)(3).
83. See CC (TA) 1762/71 Baron v. Ben-Marji, [1973] IsrDC 5734(1) 445.
84. DK (1975) 3953, 3955-56.
85. See CA 570/72 Baron v. Ben-Marji [1975] 9 Savir 243 (Isr. S. Ct.).
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proximately double the first. Eventually, and possibly due to some lobby-
ing by the Road Accident Victims Organization and the Israeli Bar
Association, the Knesset adopted the second version by a bare majority
(36:32),86 although its supporters believed this too was deficient.87
The Bill of 1973 did not state that the cap on non-economic damages
would be linked to the consumer price index, but the Minister of Finance
was authorized to change it with the approval of the Knesset Finance
Committee.m During a period in which the annual consumer price index
frequently reached double digits, failing to link the cap to the index
would have caused a rapid decrease in the real value of non-economic
damages and unremitting pressure on the Minister to raise the cap. Of
course, any attempt to raise the cap would prompt power struggles be-
tween interested parties.89 Insurance companies probably understood
that adopting the original proposal could work to their detriment because
if the cap were to be frequently adjusted, the growing gap between non-
economic damages under traditional tort law and under RAVCA would
repeatedly resurface. Ultimately, the cap was linked to the consumer
price index,90 and the authority to raise the cap, which had meanwhile
been transferred from the Minister of Finance to the Minister of Justice,
has never been exercised.
Two comments must be made here. First, although RAVCA was en-
acted on July 29, 1975, it provided that the cap would be linked to the
consumer price index only from the date of its coming into force, namely
September 25, 1976.91 In that short period, the index rose 40%, so the
real value of the cap plummeted before its actual linkage to the index.
Even if damages for pain and suffering in ordinary tort actions had only
increased in accordance with the rate of the index, the gap between the
amounts awarded under tort law and under RAVCA, which was already
significant when the Act was adopted, had increased considerably by late
September 1976. Second, and more importantly, over the years, damages
for pain and suffering in tort actions increased at a rate that significantly
exceeded the rate of inflation.92 The gap between the highest amounts
that courts were willing to award in ordinary tort actions and the RAVCA
cap thus continued to widen. While the RAVCA cap currently stands at
NIS 150,000,93 damages for pain and suffering in ordinary tort actions
86. DK (1975) 3963.
87. Id. at 3956.
88. Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 1973, HH, 406, § 4(a)(3).
89. DK (1975) 3954 (statement of the chair of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Com-
mittee, Zerach Warhaftig).
90. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 4(b).
91. See id.
92. See DAVID KATZIR, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 622 n.54 (4th ed. 1997).
93. NIS 1 = IL 10,000. The New Israeli Shekel replaced the old Shekel in 1986. Bank
of Israel Banknotes and Coins Catalog, http://www.bankisreael.govil/cartel/eng/cat-all)eng.
htm?seeries_num=8 (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). The Shekel replaced the Israeli pound
(Lira) in 1980. Bank of Israel Banknotes and Coins Catalog, http://www.bankisrael.gov.ill
catalleng/cat.all-eng.htm?seriesnum=8 (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
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may reach NIS 500,000 - 1,000,000 in severe cases. 94
This, however, is not the end of the story. Where the victim's life ex-
pectancy is shortened due to an injury, an Israeli court in an ordinary tort
action can award damages for the non-pecuniary component of loss of life
expectancy (what an American lawyer may refer to as "hedonic damages
for wrongful death")95 in addition to damages for pain and suffering.
Compensation under this type of damage may amount to hundreds of
thousands of shekels in particularly grave cases. 96 Sections 2(a) and 3 of
the Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Assessment of
Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses) 97 establish the formula for calculat-
ing non-economic damages recoverable by victims of road accidents sub-
ject to the statutory cap. The calculation is based on three parameters
(level of disability, age, and duration of hospitalization), which are a sub-
set of the considerations that have always guided the courts in determin-
ing the extent of damages for pain and suffering. So, arguably, this
calculation was intended to determine only the extent of damages for
pain and suffering and did not preclude additional compensation for loss
of life expectancy. 98 However, the explicit wording of RAVCA and the
unequivocal legislative intent led the Supreme Court to rule that the term
94. The following table provides several examples of pain and suffering awards in
cases of severe injuries.
Nominal In late-
Case Date award 2008 NIS
CA 283/89 Haifa v. Moskowitz [1989] IsrSC 47(2) 718. 3/30/1989 150,000 540,000
CA 5049/91 Kupat Holim v. Rachman [1991] IsrSC
49(2) 369. 9/26/1991 200,000 465,000
CA 2517/93 Boym v. Guttehin [1993] IsrSC-Takdin
1994(2) 335. 5/2/1993 600,000 1,200,000
CA 702/87 State of Israel v. Cohen [1994] IsrSC 48(2)
705. 5/8/1994 180,000 330,000
CA 6978/96 Amar v. Kupat Holim [1996] IsrSC 55(1)
920. 8/2/1996 400,000 570,000
CA 390/99 Kupat Holim v. Dayan [1998] 1srSC 55 (1)
765. 12/9/1998 600,000 715,000
CA 2055/99 John Doe v. Ze'ev [2001] IsrSC 55(5) 241. 7/11/2001 500,000 580,000
CA 390/06 Grinstein v. Ackerstein Indus. Ltd. [2008]
(unpublished). 7/22/2008 500,000 500,000
95. See, e.g., Cindy Domingue-Hendrickson, Note, New Mexico Adopts Hedonic Dam-
ages in the Context of Wrongful Death Actions: Sears v. Nissan (Romero v. Byers), 25 N.M.
L. REV. 385, 385-87 (1995); Erin A. O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death:
Are Tortfeasors Getting Away With Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 1687, 1687, 1692 (1990).
96. See, e.g., CA 4022/98 Technion-Isr. Inst. Tech. v. Twister [1999] IsrSC-Takdin
1999(2) 255 (awarding NIS 350,000 for a fourteen year reduction in life expectancy); see
also infra note 98.
97. Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Assessment of Damages for
Non-Pecuniary Losses), 1976, KT 3590, 2706.
98. This argument was endorsed by the District Court in Haifa. CC (Hi) 160/92
Yifrach v. El-Al Isr. Airlines, [1996] IsrDC-Takdin 1996(1) 448 (awarding a road accident
victim NIS 175,000 for loss of life expectancy in addition to non-economic damages under
the Regulations); CC (Hi) 417/89 Ghanayim v. Hamed, [1998] IsrDC-Takdin 1998(1)
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"non-pecuniary loss" in section 4 of the Act covers all non-pecuniary
losses, including pain and suffering and loss of life expectancy. Put differ-
ently, compensation for non-economic losses under RAVCA and its regu-
lations is exhaustive. 99 This ineluctable conclusion substantially broadens
the already wide gap between non-economic damages in ordinary tort
cases and non-economic damages under RAVCA.100
The draft of the first amendment to the Act, introduced in late 1977,
provided, inter alia, that the cap on non-economic damages would be re-
duced to IL 75,000 and that it would be linked to the consumer price
index only from January 1978 onwards.101 By then, the amount of dam-
ages for pain and suffering in ordinary torts claims had reached IL
300,000,102 and courts had begun to award higher damages for loss of life
expectancy.103 The proposed amendment was passed in the first reading
by a tiny majority of 25:23.104 However, the proposed reduction was dis-
carded by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee during the prepa-
ration of the draft law for the second and third readings.105 It is
conceivable that the proposed reduction was used as a bargaining chip to
secure the passage of the more important component of the same draft
law, whereby damages for loss of earnings and earning capacity are calcu-
lated on the basis of net income.
3. The Exclusivity Provision
To sum up, under considerable pressure of the insurance industry, the
legislature established rigid limitations on the scope of economic and
non-economic damages payable to road accident victims. Still, this
achievement would have been incomplete without an exclusivity provi-
sion. According to section 8, "one who acquired a cause of action under
this Act following a road accident .. . shall not have a cause of action for
11865 (awarding NIS 700,000 for loss of life expectancy in addition to non-economic dam-
ages under the Regulations).
99. See CA 2801/96 El-Al Isr. Airlines v. Yifrach [1998] IsrSC 55(1) 817, 833-39; see
also DK (1973) 4010 (statement of MK Ari Ankorion) ("[T]o my colleague, MK Chaim
Zadok, who spoke about other heads of damages, such as loss of life expectancy, and loss
of the amenities of life, I must say that the Bill speaks about non-economic damages, and
not about pain and suffering. This evidently encompasses all types of non-economic
loss.").
100. Moreover, under the general principles of Israeli tort law, the victim's estate, in the
case of a fatal injury, is entitled to full compensation for the loss of life expectancy and for
pain and suffering-if the death was not immediate. On the other hand, the estate of a
road accident victim is entitled to 25% of the maximum award for non-economic damages
under RAVCA. See Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Assessment of
Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses), 1976, KT 3590, 2706, § 4. An attempt to challenge
the validity of this section failed. CA 184/80 Bigler v. HaMagen Ins. Co. [1981] IsrSC 35(3)
518.
101. DK (1978) 740.
102. See CA 42/78 Israel v. Rachamim [1979] IsrSC 33(1) 208.
103. See, e.g., CA 402/75 Estate of Israel Mashiach v. Rosneblum [1976] IsrSC 30(3) 97;
CA 384/74 Estate of David Azulay v. Vulcan Casting Indus. [1975] IsrSC 30(1) 374.
104. DK (1978) 750.
105. Id. at 919.
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bodily injury under [general tort law]."o10 6 In the absence of this provi-
sion, victims of negligently caused road accidents would have been able
to exercise their limited rights under RAVCA and bring an action in tort
for the difference between the actual loss and the limited statutory com-
pensation. Insofar as the additional compensation would have also fallen
on the shoulders of insurance companies (under liability insurance poli-
cies), those companies would not have benefited from the statutory caps.
The exclusivity provision ensures that the overall liability of insurance
companies will, in any event, be strictly limited.107
Arguably, a social reform intended to provide a limited and immediate
remedy for accident victims should not contain an exclusivity provision.
If a particular act fails to fully compensate the victim for negligently
caused injuries, an exclusivity provision denies that victim the fundamen-
tal right to full compensation for harm caused by wrongful conduct.108 A
social reform should generally extend legal protection by providing a rem-
edy for those who are not entitled to compensation under the law of obli-
gations; it should not override existing rights. Accordingly, most social
compensation schemes, including the Israeli work accident compensation
and veterans' disability compensation systems, do not include exclusivity
provisions.109 In this respect, RAVCA is exceptional. But at this stage,
the reader can hardly be surprised. The exclusivity provision, alongside
the caps on economic and non-economic damages, primarily served the
economic interests of insurance companies. 110
106. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 8.
107. Arguably, the exclusivity provision denies not only the victim's right of action in
torts, but also the insurer's right of subrogation against a third party whose negligence
caused the accident. See CA 3765/95 Hussein v. Turm [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 573. However,
from the insurer's perspective, this is an insignificant price to pay for the advantageous
statutory caps. In the vast majority of cases, a road accident is caused by negligent driving,
and so the driver's insurer would not have had a right of subrogation even if the exclusivity
provision had not existed. Moreover, the exclusivity provision precludes recovery under
general tort law. RAVCA § 8. It does not preclude recovery under the Defective Products
Liability Act (DPLA). Defective Products Liability Act (DPLA), 1980, S.H. 86; RAVCA
§ 8. A road accident victim who also has a cause of action under the DPLA will generally
prefer to bring an action under RAVCA because, while both acts set similar caps, RAVCA
is deemed more efficient. But the availability of a cause of action under the DPLA pro-
vides the basis for a right of subrogation in the appropriate cases.
108. DK (1973) 4004-05 (statement of MK Nissim Eliad).
109. For instance, the Ontario no-fault auto insurance scheme does not include an ex-
clusivity provision. Feldthusen, supra note 80, at 480-81, 485. The German no-fault road
accident scheme also preserves fault-based actions. Strassenverkehrsgesetz [Road Traffic
Act], Mar. 5, 2003 BGB1.I at 310, S. 16 (F.R.G.). Statutory schemes in other jurisdictions
usually include exclusivity provisions only if they do not set caps on damages. See
MARKESINIS, supra note 26, at 697 (discussing the Swiss Road Traffic Act). There are a
few exceptions. The most notable is New Zealand's statutory scheme. See Injury Preven-
tion, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, 2001 S.N.Z. No. 49, §§ 317-318 (N.Z.).
110. See DK (1973) 4003 (statement of MK Shmuel Tamir: "Who are the Ministry of
Justice and the Ministry of Finance protecting? The affluent insurance companies? Is this
simply the Ministry of Finance's continued flirtation with big business?"); see also id. at
4014 (statement of MK Uri Avneri) ("It seems that the Minister of Finance continues to
appease the wealthiest at the expense of the less wealthy. The insurance companies are
among the richest and most pampered companies in Israel.").
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4. The Benefit to Insurance Companies
One possible counterargument is that statutory caps on insurance com-
panies' liability serve the interests of the insured because they guarantee
relatively low and stable premiums. This argument is disingenuous.
While setting rigid caps on economic and non-economic damages may
help maintain low and stable premiums, it guarantees only low and stable
payments to victims. As long as premiums may increase at rates that are
unjustified in light of the relevant risks, restricting liability is principally
the interest of the insurer. It is no wonder, then, that the insurance com-
panies waged a battle on two fronts. On one front, they worked to re-
duce their expenses through compensation caps and deductions, together
with the exclusivity provision. On the other front, they repeatedly, and
without a real justification, urged the regulator to increase the premiums,
and thus, their revenues, as will be shown in Part III. The simultaneous
liability restriction and premiums increase produced an enormous posi-
tive cash-flow for insurance companies.
Even if limiting liability truly resulted in low premiums, insurance com-
panies would still benefit from such a limitation. First, doing away with
caps and deductions would result in one of two possibilities. One is that
insurance premiums would be prohibitively high, prompting public pro-
test and renewed examination of RAVCA's merits. The traffic victims'
insurance sector would once again face the threat of "nationalization."
The second possibility is that insurers would partially or fully absorb the
additional risk, with a subsequent decline in profitability. Understanda-
bly, neither option would be welcomed by the insurance industry. Re-
stricting liability reduces the likelihood of these eventualities. When the
expected payment to any victim is lower, insurance companies can make
greater profits without imposing an intolerable burden on the insured.
Furthermore, caps and deductions strengthen the bargaining power of in-
surance companies in negotiating settlements with victims. Litigation is
time consuming, wearisome, and costly, so the lower the expected recov-




One of the reform's main objectives was to accelerate victims' healing
process through interim compensation. Interim compensation covers the
victim's medical expenses and cost of living during the legal process. It
satisfies the victim's immediate, and often urgent, needs in the course of
litigation, thereby facilitating recovery and rehabilitation while prevent-
ing insurance companies from using victims' misfortune to impel them to
settle for less than they deserve."' The Bill of 1973 provided that "the
person liable under the Act ... must immediately pay the victim or de-
111. DK (1973) 4003; IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 8.
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posit with the court for the victim's benefit any portion of the damages
that cannot be reasonably disputed." 112 Participants in the pre-enact-
ment deliberations explained that "immediately" denoted less than a
month after the accident. 113
Unfortunately, prior to the second and third readings, the chair of the
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee stated that the Committee had
not endorsed the above proposal; instead, it accepted the claim of the
insurance companies' organization that "immediate payment of a signifi-
cant portion of the amount claimed would complicate the legal process by
dividing it into two burdensome trials in which the parties would put for-
ward the same arguments and submit the same evidence, and therefore
the cost of litigation would increase."114 Consequently, the Committee
proposed that a person liable under RAVCA (and his or her insurer)
would reimburse the victim for medical expenses actually incurred and
make monthly payments to cover the victim's medical and nursing needs
and basic costs of living until the case was tried or settled. This proposal
was ultimately approved on the second and third readings.' 15 According
to the accepted version, the victim must formally apply for interim pay-
ments.116 The person liable and his or her insurer then have sixty days to
comply.' 1 7 In the case of non-compliance, the victim has to submit a spe-
cial request to a competent court."18
The difference between a "portion of the damages that cannot be rea-
sonably disputed" and monthly payments that cover particular needs can
be enormous. For instance, assume that a twenty-year-old woman who
earned NIS 5,000 a month and spent 60% of her income on basic necessi-
ties is injured in a road accident. Assume further that the victim contends
that she has lost all of her earning capacity, whereas the insurance com-
pany claims that she lost only 80% of that capacity. The portion of the
claimed sum that cannot be reasonably disputed is the capitalized value
of an annual loss of NIS 80% * 5,000 * 12 over 45 years (until retirement).
Assuming a constant interest rate of 3% a year, the present worth factor
is 24.5187, and so the undisputed amount should be 80% * 5,000 * 12 *
24.5187 = NIS 1,176,898. This is the amount that the victim would receive
under the original proposal. The sum that she will actually receive under
RAVCA is, at most, NIS 3,000 a month, and if her standard of living has
not deteriorated following the accident because she has other sources of
income, then she will not receive interim payments at all.119
Reported cases show that the ratio between interim payments and ulti-
112. Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill, 1973, HH, 406, § 4(c).
113. DK (1973) 4013.
114. DK (1975) 3954.
115. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 5.
116. Id. § 5(h).
117. See id.
118. Id. § 5A.
119. Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Interim Payments), 1989, KT
5200, 1090, § 3(b).
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mate awards is indeed very loW.120 Moreover, interim compensation is
paid periodically, and not in a lump sum. Finally, it is not always immedi-
ate. As previously mentioned, while the original proposal obliged an in-
surance company to pay the undisputed amount "immediately"-namely
within one month of the accident-and without notice, the Act as it was
ultimately worded requires the victim to initiate a request and then gives
the insurer sixty days to comply with that request.121 Insurance compa-
nies often do not comply, thereby necessitating a separate legal process
and delayed payment. Thus, in many cases, the victim obtains the first
interim award long after the accident.122 Under those circumstances, and
given the duration and cost of litigation, many victims are presumably
induced to settle for partial and inadequate compensation. More impor-
tantly, as explained above, insurance companies can benefit from delay-
ing payments. The deviation from the original proposal, in practice,
allows insurance companies to delay payment of a significant amount of
money. These two facts may explain insurance companies' insistence on
the revision.
2. Periodic Payments
An additional achievement of the insurance companies, albeit of secon-
dary importance, relates to the manner in which damages are awarded at
the end of the legal process. From the outset, it was clear that periodic
payments (being standard practice for work accident victims) better ac-
complish the stated social goal than does lump sum compensation (cus-
tomary in tort cases).12 3 From a social perspective, lump sum payments
have two flaws.124 First, a victim receiving a large payment might spend it
all at once, invest it foolishly, or divide it up between his family members
and, in a short time, become a welfare case.125 Periodic payments ensure
that the victim benefits from the compensation for a long period of time.
120. E.g., CC (Hi) 417/89 Ghanayim v. Suaed, [1998] IsrDC-Takdin 1998(1) 420 (total
award: NIS 8,177,365; interim payments: NIS 1,058,300 (12.9%)).
121. RAVCA § 5.
122. See, e.g., CC (TA) 65/91 Faraj v. The Auto Insurance Pool, [1995] IsrDC-Takdin
1995(1) 720 (accident occurring on October 25, 1989 and interim payment awarded more
than two years later, on January 9, 1992); CC (TA) 40/97 Sheinland v. Migdal Ins. Co.,
(1998] IsrDC-Takdin, 1998(2) 2443 (accident occurring on June 21, 1996 and interim pay-
ment awarded on May 10, 1998).
123. See DK (1973) 4003-04 (statement of MK Reuven Arazi); IMPLEMENTATION COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 78-79.
124. Admittedly, lump-sum awards may have an advantage from an economic effi-
ciency perspective because periodic payments are more costly to administer. See WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 46-47
(1987). Arguably, periodic payments that are adjusted in accordance with the victim's con-
dition reduce the victim's incentive to take measures to recover (because recovery reduces
the periodic payment). But a court can solve this problem by reducing the periodic pay-
ment if the victim does not take the necessary steps or by holding that the payments are
not contingent on future events. See Samuel A. Rea, Lump-Sum Versus Periodic Damage
Awards, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 143, 148 (1981).




Second, a lump-sum payment ignores future changes in basic needs and
medical and rehabilitation costs that cannot be foreseen at the time of
judgment. 126 In that sense, flexible periodic payments are arguably a bet-
ter fit with the principle of restitutio in integrum, which is a fundamental
principle in the law of remedies.
The idea of compensating road accident victims in the form of periodic
payments was brought up more than once in the discussions that pre-
ceded the reform1 27 and was included in the recommendations of the
Berenson Committee in 1972.128 However, it was not reflected in the Bill
of 1973. The Minister of Justice opined that it was "preferable to carry
out the reform in two stages; first approve the Bill as is, and then, when
the time is ripe, introduce periodic payments."1 29 The official reason was
that:
[Olpinions are divided with respect to potential victims' responses.
Some say that periodic payments are desirable because they elimi-
nate the risk of a person receiving a large sum of money and subse-
quently wasting it, thus becoming a burden on the public; and others
argue that this method practically imposes guardianship on a large
group, and that this is problematic.130
However, the opposing reason seems unconvincing because this kind of
paternalistic "guardianship" has already been imposed on an even larger
group, namely victims of work accidents.131
What then is the reason for the deviation from the Berenson Commit-
tee recommendations? Arguably, two elements combined to cause the
deviation. First, from the insurance companies' perspective, a lump sum
payment is generally-but not always-preferable to periodic pay-
ments.132 The traditional method has the advantage of finality and cer-
tainty,133 and its administrative cost is relatively low.13 4 Second, under
the Bill of 1973, an insurance company was supposed to immediately pay
the victim that part of the damages "that cannot be reasonably disputed."
So the choice of a payment method at the end of the legal process be-
came marginal.
126. See CA 283/89 Haifa v. Moskowitz [1989] IsrSC 47(2) 718, 725; CA 357/80 Naim v.
Barda [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 762, 781-82.
127. See DK (1973) 4003-04 (statement of MK Reuven Arazi).
128. BERENSON COMM., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IM-
PROVEMENT OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1972) (discussed in DK (1973) 4002).
129. DK (1973) 4002.
130. Id.
131. National Insurance Act [Consolidated Version], 1995, S.H. 210, H 103-17. The NIL
pays an annuity to severely injured work accident victims. Id.
132. Margaret Devaney, A Comparative Assessment of Personal Injuries Compensation
Schemes: Lessons for Tort Reform?, ELEC. J. COMP. LAW, Sept. 2009, at 2, http://www.ejcl.
org/133/artl33-2.pdf. In fact, many victims also prefer a lump-sum payment, even when
this entails a compromise. See id. Presumably, the reason is more psychological than eco-
nomic. Perhaps the average victim does not wish to depend on an insurance company for a
long period of time. Moreover, lawyers clearly prefer lump-sum payments (especially if
they handle cases on a contingency fee basis).
133. See Englard, A Decade of Experience, supra note 11, at 159.
134. See id.; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 124, at 46.
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The idea of periodic payments was once again raised after the first
reading, during the debates of the Constitution, Law and Justice Commit-
tee, and apparently in the wake of the Committee's revision of the rules
pertaining to immediate payment. Since the use of this system was in-
tended to protect the victim, the Committee decided that periodic pay-
ments would be awarded by the court at the victim's request.135
Given the advantages of periodic payments, insurance companies pre-
sumably realized that outright opposition to this method could push the
legislature back to the idea of "nationalization," especially since the NII
was accustomed to paying monthly allowances to (work) accident vic-
tims.136 Accordingly, the insurance companies' opposition was not cate-
gorical. Nonetheless, they insisted that "the Act should only establish the
principle ... and leave the details for regulations," and that "both parties,
the plaintiff and the defendant alike, would be able to request that the
court order payment of damages in a periodic manner." 137
The first demand was apparently intended to enable the companies to
conduct the battle over the particulars of the scheme in what they re-
garded as a more convenient forum (vis-A-vis the Ministry of Justice and
not the parliamentary battleground).' 3 8 In my view, the second demand
had two rationales. First, it was intended to give the insurance companies
another bargaining chip in their negotiations with road accident victims.
A victim desiring a lump sum payment knows that if he or she rejects the
insurance company's settlement proposal, not only is the process likely to
drag on for years, but the company might ultimately request that dam-
ages be paid in a periodic manner.139 Second, an insurance company
might occasionally prefer not to pay damages in a lump sum. If the inter-
est rate on which the present worth factor is based is lower than real
return that the company can expect from investing the entire sum, it will
presumably prefer to make small periodic payments, as long as the bene-
fits exceed the risk of an increase in the amount of the periodic payment.
The consistent reduction of the interest rate on which the present worth
factor is based from the 1950s through the 1970s140 made it clear to insur-
ance companies that a lump sum payment might not be worthwhile and
135. DK (1975) 3954 (statement of the chair of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Com-
mittee, Zerach Warhaftig); id. at 3958 (statement of the Minister of Justice, Chaim Zadok).
136. National Insurance Act [Consolidated Version], 1995, S.H. 210, §§ 103-17.
137. See Hachami, supra note 52, at 7.
138. Negotiating with the Ministry of Justice is more convenient for the insurance com-
panies for several reasons: (1) it is far from the spotlight and attracts less public attention;
(2) it is conducted with a few functionaries rather than dozens of Knesset members; (3) an
average functionary is generally less accountable than a Knesset member; and (4) many
functionaries expect to benefit from their relations with big business after their retirement
from public service.
139. DK (1975) 3961 (statement of MK Yoram Aridor).
140. The interest rate on which the present worth factor is based was 6% in the early
1950s. See, e.g., CA 188/54 Schwarzbard v. Holzman [1954] IsrSC 8(2) 1443, 1445. It was
5% between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. See, e.g., CA 313/56 Isr. Elec. Corp. v.
Bloomberg [1957] IsrSC 11(2) 1087, 1094; CA 553/73 Eliahu v. Hanhan [1975] IsrSC 29(2)




underscored the importance of being able to request periodic payments.
Furthermore, an insurance company, like any other defendant, may pre-
fer the periodic method when it is convinced that the victim's life expec-
tancy is shorter than what he or she claims it to be, because in that way
the insurance company does not bear the risk of having to pay for losses
that the victim will not truly sustain.
The first demand did not trigger any significant dispute. In accordance
with the proposal of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, and
without any reservations, the Minister of Justice was authorized to enact
regulations whereby compensation for loss of earning capacity and ongo-
ing expenses would be paid in a periodic manner. The Minister only en-
acted the Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Periodic
Payments) in 1978.141 The imprint of the insurance companies on these
regulations is evident, yet unsurprising. The Berenson Committee recom-
mended that courts be authorized to award periodic payments where the
degree of the plaintiff's functional disability exceeded 20%, and would be
obligated to do so where the disability exceeded 50%.142 The regulations,
on the other hand, authorized the court to award periodic payments if
"the victim lost 40% or more of his future earning capacity following the
accident" or if "the damages constitute the victim's principal source of
livelihood." 14 3 Under no circumstances is the court obligated to award
periodic payments, and it is allowed to do so only when the injury is quite
severe.
The second demand triggered a dispute among the members of the
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. Most of the Committee mem-
bers supported the proposal that authorized a court to award periodic
payments only at the victim's request. The minority argued that the words
"at the victim's request" should be deleted for two reasons. First, a court
should retain full discretion on this matter because victims do not always
know what their best interests are.144 This argument is problematic not
only because it assumes that people do not know what is best for them
and how to make the best use of their money, but also because if the
victim's best interest is the main consideration, then it is inconceivable
that insurance companies would be empowered to initiate the request for
periodic payments.145 It would be more plausible to authorize a court to
award periodic payments on its own initiative or at the victim's request.
This would give courts broad discretion without providing insurance com-
panies with another means of promoting their own economic interests.
The second reason, reiterating insurance companies' openly-declared po-
sition, was that the majority's proposal would generate procedural ine-
141. Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Periodic Payments), 1978, KT
3815, 706.
142. See ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 14, at 195-96.
143. Road Accident Victims Compensation Regulations (Periodic Payments) § 1.
144. See DK (1975) 3958 (statement of the Minister of Justice, Chaim Zadok).
145. See DK (1975) 3961 (statement of MK Yoram Aridor).
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quality between the parties.1 4 6 However, the Constitution, Law, and
Justice Committee provided a convincing explanation for the distinction
between the parties: periodic payments are intended to protect the vic-
tim's interests, so the power to apply for such payments should be exclu-
sively the victim's. Ultimately, the minority's reservation was adopted on
the second reading by a 42:34 majority, 14 7 and the power to apply for
periodic payment was also granted to the insurance companies. Natu-
rally, it has rarely been used.
D. AMENDMENT No. 8
During its first fifteen years, RAVCA did not provide a definition for
the phrase "use of a motor vehicle," despite its central role in the statu-
tory definition of a "road accident." The task of interpreting this phrase
was thus imposed wholly on the Supreme Court of Israel. The Court en-
deavored to broaden the circle of victims entitled to compensation under
the Act by interpreting the phrase "use of a motor vehicle" in a generous
and inclusive manner, believing that this was consistent with the Act's
social purpose. The seminal case was Shulman v. Zion Insurance Co.,148
which established three important rules. First, a "principal use" of a mo-
tor vehicle is any use that fulfills its purpose. Accordingly, in the case of a
multipurpose vehicle, each of its purposes (even those that are not trans-
port-related) will be deemed use thereof.1 4 9 Second, "use of a motor ve-
hicle" includes "ancillary use," namely auxiliary measures and related
acts necessary for the realization of the vehicle's purpose (or pur-
poses).' 50 Under this criterion, not only roadside repairs of the vehicle
are part of its use, but also repairs carried out at home or in a garage
because repairs are necessary for the fulfillment of the vehicle's primary
purpose.151 Third, the causal link between "use of a motor vehicle" and a
personal injury may exist even if the injury results from the intentional
act of a third party, provided that the injury falls within the risks created
by the vehicle's principal or ancillary use.15 2 For example, a causal link
was found to exist when the injury stemmed from: tampering with the
car's brakes, causing an accident in the course of driving;153 detonating
explosives hidden in the car at the moment of ignition or during the
ride; t54 throwing stones at the car (even if the injury was caused by slivers
146. Id. at 3957 (statement of MK Ari Ankorion).
147. DK (1975) 3963; see also DK (1975) 3961, 3957-58 (presenting the minority's
reservation).
148. CA 358/83 Shulman v. Zion Ins. Co. [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 844.
149. Id. at 858. For example, trenching is a principal use of a backhoe loader.
150. Id. at 858-59. The following are considered ancillary uses: entrance to and exit
from a motor vehicle, changing a flat tire, washing the vehicle, parking the vehicle, and
loading and unloading the vehicle.
151. Id. at 860-61.
152. Id. at 868-69.
153. Id. at 866.
154. Id. at 871-74.
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of glass and not by interference with the driving); 155 and intentionally
slamming a truck's door on the plaintiff's leg.156
The Supreme Court's generous interpretation of the statutory concepts
led to a relatively aggressive legislative reaction in the form of Amend-
ment No. 8.15 Technically, Amendment No. 8 modified the definitions of
the terms "road accident" and "victim" and added a new definition for
the phrase "use of a motor vehicle." Essentially, the Amendment was
intended to narrow the definition of the term "road accident," which had
crystallized in the rulings of the Supreme Court.1 58 First and foremost,
the Amendment removed from the Act's ambit accidents that did not
stem from the use of motor vehicles for transportation, even if they oc-
curred while using a vehicle for another of its intended purposes. 159 Sec-
ond, the legislature narrowed the range of activities considered to be
"ancillary" uses of a vehicle. For example, it was clarified that mainte-
nance or repair of a motor vehicle would be considered "use" only in the
case of roadside repairs by the driver or another person who does not
provide this service in the course of his or her work. The Act no longer
covers roadside assistance provided by professionals or repairs carried
out at home or in a garage.160 Third, Amendment No. 8 explicitly ex-
cluded intentionally caused injuries from the Act's coverage. It added the
following provision to the definition of a "road accident":
an event shall not be regarded as a road accident if it occurred as a
result of an act intended to cause injury to the person or property of
the victim, and the injury was caused by the act itself and not by its
impact on the use of the motor vehicle.161
Why was this Amendment passed? One explanation was that the
Amendment would facilitate victims' recovery by substantially shortening
litigation.162 However, this prediction is puzzling. The new definitions
are not simpler than the previous definitions interpreted by the Supreme
Court, and so the volume of legal questions could not really be expected
to drop. Unsurprisingly, the new definitions have given rise to interpreta-
155. Id. at 870-71.
156. Id. at 869.
157. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (Amendment No. 8), 1990, S.H. 2.
158. See DK (1990) 5224; see also IZHAK ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VicrIM COMPEN-
SATION 3 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VIcnm COMPENSATION
3D].
159. The Amendment redefined the term "road accident" as an occurrence in which a
person sustains bodily injury as a result of the use of a motor vehicle for transportation and
provided a transport-oriented definition of the phrase "use of a motor vehicle." Limiting
RAVCA's applicability to transport-related risks was the main purpose of the Amend-
ment. See Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill (Amendment No. 8), 1989, HH 31,
32-33; DK (1990) 2269; RVLIN, supra note 13, at 3, 105-06.
160. See Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 1 (de-
fining "use" of a motor vehicle).
161. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (Amendment No. 8), 1990, S.H. 2.




tive difficulties in recent decades. 163 Moreover, Amendment No. 8 did
not change the scope and complexity of factual disputes, nor did it con-
tain any procedural breakthroughs. It seems, therefore, that the only
conceivable time saving might result from the reduction in number of
potential claimants (and potential claims). Yet a reduction in the number
of potential claims under RAVCA could only marginally contribute to
shortening litigation. This marginal benefit comes at a significant cost: it
denies redress to victims who were entitled to recovery under the original
version of the Act. The Amendment cannot be said to "facilitate recov-
ery" by those victims.
Still, the main explanation for the Amendment was set forth by then
Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor. He explained that the Supreme Court's
liberal interpretation of RAVCA was detrimental to a large portion of
the population: "It imposes a heavy burden on drivers who are forced to
pay additional premiums for insurance against risks unrelated to trans-
portation" and "we do not think it is justified."164 But this position is
problematic. RAVCA spreads losses that stem from the use of motor
vehicles among the owners of such vehicles and not among drivers.165
Apparently, the justification for imposing the burden on this group is that
its members are the ones who actually chose to possess and use-directly
or indirectly-these dangerous objects and are the main beneficiaries of
their existence. According to this logic, one cannot argue that spreading
an injury among all motor vehicle owners is justified only when the injury
stems from realizing transportation risks in the narrow sense. The use of
motor vehicles creates a plethora of dangers that would not arise if motor
vehicles did not exist. If we believe that spreading the cost of injuries
resulting from the materialization of risks inherent in the use of motor
vehicles among their owners is warranted, then we cannot claim that it is
unjustified to spread the cost of injuries stemming from some of the risks
associated with the natural and ordinary use of such vehicles. Arguably,
any distinction between the various risks inherent in the use of motor
vehicles is contrived.
Note that Amendment No. 8 also excluded from RAVCA's coverage
certain types of cases in which a person was injured due to the materiali-
zation of transport-related risks, such as road accidents caused by terror-
ist activities 166 or accidents that occurred in the course of professional
maintenance of a car,167 although the official rationale for the Amend-
163. See ENGLARD, ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIMs COMPENSATION 30, supra note 158, at
73.
164. DK (1990) 2269-70; see also Road Accident Victims Compensation Bill (Amend-
ment No. 8), 1989, HH, 31, 32; DK (1990) 5057; CA 2199/99 Estate of Oded Lazar v. Port
& Ry. Auth. [2001] IsrSC 56(1) 938, 951-52.
165. See generally RAVCA.
166. The Amendment modified the definition of "victim" in RAVCA section 1, exclud-
ing victims of terrorist activities (even where the injury was caused by the terrorist activ-
ity's impact on the use of the motor vehicle).
167. This issue is discussed above. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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ment does not support such an exclusion.168
But even if we agree that it is unjust to impose the burden of insurance
against risks unrelated to transport on motor vehicle owners and ignore
the revisions that are inconsistent with this rationale, it is still necessary to
examine whether the Amendment truly realized its proclaimed goal and
reduced mandatory auto insurance premiums, or at least prevented their
increase. One year after Shulman, mandatory auto insurance premiums
shot up 9%-10% in real terms (a nominal rise of more than 30%).169
The question is therefore, whether premium rates reverted to the pre-
Shulman level following the Amendment, as promised by its drafters. The
Amendment was adopted on September 30, 1990. Three months later,
mandatory insurance premiums were adjusted.170 The new premiums
were higher than the premiums that preceded the Amendment by 36.3%
nominally, and by 8.2% in real terms. One may argue that the new
Amendment could not be expected to have an impact on premiums only
three months after its enactment. However, in the next adjustment of
premium rates in the summer of 1993,171 about three years after the
Amendment was adopted, the premiums were raised by more than 18%
in real terms (62% nominally). The aggregate increase in premium rates
from the enactment of Amendment No. 8 until the summer of 1993 was
28% in real terms (120% in nominal terms). This rise could not be justi-
fied by the actual changes in variables relevant to the assessment of ex-
pected payments by insurance companies (annual number of victims,
average scope of compensation for each victim, and number of the in-
sured), even if the number of potential plaintiffs under RAVCA was not
reduced by Amendment No. 8.172
This being the case, is it possible to argue that the Amendment actually
benefited the insured? In terms of the end result, there is reason for
skepticism. The Amendment was enacted in order to ease the burden on
motor vehicle owners, but immediately after its enactment, the regulator
significantly increased premium rates. Presumably, the view that an
amendment was required to ease the burden on the insured rested, inter
alia, on representations made by representatives of the insurance indus-
try. As Part III will show, the demand to increase the premiums in the
years that followed the Amendment was also initiated by the insurance
companies. It is thus possible to conclude that, in a relatively short pe-
168. The legislature probably intended to preclude recovery under RAVCA whenever
an alternative compensation scheme was available for the victim. But it is unclear why the
existence of an alternative compensation scheme should deprive road accident victims of
their rights under RAVCA.
169. See Road Accident Victims Compensation Order (Premium Rates), 1988, KT
5135, 18 (pre-Shulman rates); Road Accident Victims Compensation Order (Premium
Rates), 1989, KT 5212, 1274 (post-Shulman rates).
170. Road Accident Victims Compensation Order (Premium Rates), 1990, KT 5318,
365.
171. Road Accident Victims Compensation Order (Premium Rates), 1993, KT 5540,
1068.
172. My calculations are based on the data used in Part III below.
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riod of time, the insurance companies devised a combination of measures
that substantially improved their economic position.
III. THE PREMIUMS
Section 18 of the Bill of 1973 was supposed to add a qualification to
section 4A(a)(4) of the Supervision of Insurance Business Act that autho-
rizes the Minister of Finance to determine, either generally or for a par-
ticular branch of insurance, the minimum and maximum premium
rates.173 According to this qualification:
With respect to insurance policies under section 2 of the Motor Vehi-
cle Insurance Ordinance [New Version], premium rates and the
method for distributing the risks between different classes of vehicles
will be adjusted annually by a committee appointed by the Minister
of Finance in consultation with the Minister of Justice and the Minis-
ter of Transport, in accordance with criteria determined by the Min-
ister of Finance in regulations.
The main problem from the insurance companies' perspective was that
they were not accorded any official role in the committees that were sup-
posed to determine premium rates. In a memorandum submitted by the
chairman of the Insurance Companies Association to the Knesset's Con-
stitution, Law, and Justice Committee, the companies insisted that their
representatives be appointed to these committees "in a commensurate
proportion."17 4 In addition, they demanded that the criteria for deter-
mining premium rates include a fixed percentage of profit, in excess of all
costs. They further demanded an annual adjustment of premium rates
and that in the case of losses, the following year's premiums would com-
pensate them for these losses, up to the agreed level of profits.
The version ultimately adopted on the second and third readings (sec-
tion 17 of RAVCA) provided that premium rates would be determined
by the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the Minister of Justice
and the Minister of Transport, after hearing the representative organiza-
tion of the insurance companies and with the approval of the Knesset
Finance Committee. 175 The insurance companies were thus granted offi-
cial standing in the premium setting process. This is quite reasonable.
The price that a person can charge for a product he or she manufactures
or a service he or she provides cannot be determined without at least
173. Supervision of Insurance Business Act, 1951, S.H. 221.
174. See Hachami, supra note 52, at 7.
175. Road Accident Victims Compensation Act (RAVCA), 1975, S.H. 234, § 17; see
also DK (1975) 3954-55. This section was abolished by the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Insurance Under Conditions of Supervised Competition and
Arrangements for the Transition Period), 1997, S.H. 205, § 10. Section 10 was supposed to
go into effect on January 1, 2000. Id. § 16. Its date of effectiveness was postponed (twice)
until March 31, 2001. See Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Insurance Under Conditions of
Supervised Competition and Arrangements for the Transition Period) (Amendment),
2000, S.H. 58, § 4; Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Insurance Under Conditions of Super-
vised Competition and Arrangements for the Transition Period) (Amendment No. 2),
2000, S.H. 108, § 9.
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giving that person the right to present his or her arguments as to what the
price should be. On the other hand, the insurance companies' hopes for
commensurate representation in the premium setting body were dashed.
The Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee preferred to entrust the
task of determining the premiums to a "disinterested body" (namely the
Minister of Finance), and to subject it to parliamentary supervision (by
the Knesset Finance Committee). Nonetheless, it appears that the Com-
mittee overestimated the capacity of governmental and parliamentary
bodies to stand up to pressures exerted by the insurance companies.
Global experience indicates that when insurance premiums in a partic-
ular branch are determined by a regulator and not by free market forces,
the premiums are very high in relation to insured risks.'76 Instead of
competing with each other, insurance companies establish a powerful
lobby that negotiates with functionaries whose limited terms in office pre-
vent them from waging a battle against economically and politically pow-
erful entities. During the deliberations on the first amendment of
RAVCA in 1977, MK Zerach Warhaftig, one of the Act's staunchest sup-
porters, admitted that immediately after the enactment of RAVCA, in-
surance companies began to argue that premiums should be raised.
There was "intensive pressure to raise them more and more, despite the
absence of any need or real justification to do so."' Warhaftig con-
cluded: "I am deeply concerned that the Ministry of Finance is under se-
vere pressure, and cannot withstand this pressure exerted by the
insurance companies. Insurance companies are in the position of a cartel,
something akin to a monopoly. They operate together and dictate the
conditions."178 The insurance companies began to apply unrelenting
pressure even before they obtained and provided initial data about ex-
pected outlayS179 and continued to do so even when it became clear that
their revenues exceeded expected expenses. 80 This pressure paid off.
176. See, e.g., MARKESINIS, supra note 26, at 714 (explaining that the German regulator
controls auto insurance rates, which "prevents effective competition between insurance
companies and thus helps keep insurance premiums unrealistically high"); Randall
Bovbjerg, Massachusetts No-Fault: A Note on Some Changes in the Law and in Rate Levels,
in No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION 247, 249 (Alan I. Widiss et al. eds.,
1977) ("In Massachusetts, auto insurance rates are set by the Insurance Commissioner on
an industry-wide basis after hearing the insurers' requests . .. . This lack of rate competi-
tion is sometimes cited as another reason for Massachusetts' high premiums."); see also
LITAN, supra note 3, at 10 ("Contrary to a perception ... that the regulation of insurance
rates benefits consumers, the most recent academic research amply documents otherwise.
For example, states that have tightly regulated auto insurance rates have not lowered aver-
age premiums below what they otherwise would be, while distorting insurance rates for
individual classes of consumers, forcing safer drivers to subsidize higher risk drivers.").
177. DK (1978) 744.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 746 (statement of MK Mordechai Wirshovsky).
180. In 1979, insurance companies' income from the mandatory auto insurance business
was 2.7 billion Israeli pounds (1.5 billion pounds were premiums collected from the in-
sured, and 1.2 billion were the annual return on investment of accumulated reserves). In
the same year they paid out 1.1 billion pounds (0.9 billion in compensation to road accident
victims, 0.2 billion in administrative costs). Uzi Abel, Three Years Under the Road Accident
Victims Compensation Act, 21 Soc. SEC. 158, 159 (1981).
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To realize just how effective this pressure was, it is necessary to under-
stand which factors affect insurance companies' profitability. The total
sum of expenses depends first and foremost on the number of eligible
victims (n), and the average rate of compensation paid to each of them
(c).18 1 Total revenues depend on the number of the insured (i) and the
average premium paid by each of them (p). The profit rate corresponds
with d, defined as d = i * p - n * c. From the enactment of RAVCA until
the end of 2000, the number of motor vehicles in Israel (i) increased 4.23
times. In the same period, the number of drivers "using" motor vehicles
increased 3.5 times. Figure 1 depicts the ratio of total motor vehicles (and
drivers) in a given year to total motor vehicles (and drivers) on the date
of RAVCA's enactment. During those years, the annual number of road
accident victims (n) increased 1.93 times, as shown in Figure 2.182 The
maximum value on the vertical axis (the ratio axis) is identical in the two
figures to emphasize the tremendous gap between the increase in the
number of the insured-hence premiums paid-and the increase in the
number of victims-hence payments made.
FIGURE 1. RATIO OF THE NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
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181. In this part, operating costs are not considered. Presumably, the ratio between
operating costs and total expenditure has decreased as insurance companies have gradually
become more efficient. More importantly, insurance companies were allowed to charge an
additional fee for operating costs, in excess of fixed premium rates.
182. This Figure and all related calculations are based on data collected by the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics. CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 53 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
ISRAEL tbl. 24.1 (2002), available at http://www.cbs.gov.illarchive/shnaton53/st24_0l.pdf.
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FIGURE 2. RATIO OF THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS AND
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The average compensation paid to every victim (c) depends, first, on
the distribution of victims according to the severity of the injury. The
more severe the average injury, the higher the average compensation.
According to the data that forms the basis for Figure 2, the ratio of the
fatalities in 2000 to fatalities in 1976 was 0.77, whereas the ratio of the
total victims in 2000 to total victims in 1976 'vas 1.93. Put differently, the
proportion of fatalities relative to the total number of road accident vic-
tims in 2000 was 2.5 times lower than in 1976. The proportion of se-
verely-injured victims decreased at a similar rate.183 This means that the
average severity of injuries decreased, although this change cannot be ex-
pressed numerically.
Another important factor affecting average compensation is the change
in the average wage level in the economy. This factor is important be-
cause compensation for loss of earnings and earning capacity (including
loss of pension) is usually the main component of any claim under
RAVCA, especially in cases of severe injuries, which have a significant
effect on c.184 Figure 3 presents the relationship of the current value of
183. This can be deduced from a simple statistical analysis. Compare DK (1975) 3955,
with CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTIcs, 54(7) MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS tbl. Q.5
(2002), available at http://www.cbs.gov.illarchive/200307/yarhon/q5_e.htm. In 1974, 3,366
people were severely injured in road accidents (15.5% of the total number of road accident
victims). CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra. In 2000, 2,896 people were severely injured
in road accidents (7.2% of the total). Id.
184. A sample of cases reveals that this component accounts for 60%-70% of total
compensation. To this should be added compensation for attendant care (personal assis-
tance, nursing and domestic services, and home maintenance), which is also related to the
average wage in the economy.
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the average wage in the economy in a given year to the current value of
the average wage in 1977. It shows that the average wage increased 1.6
times-in real terms-between 1977 and 2000.1s5 According to this da-
tum, and given that the average severity of injuries decreased, one may
reasonably deduce that the average compensation (c) did not increase
more than 1.5 times (in real terms).
FIGURE 3. RATIO OF THE AVERAGE WAGE IN A GIVEN
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It is possible to argue that this analysis is unfair to the insurance com-
panies because the costs of medical services provided to road accident
victims, which also affect average compensation (to a lesser extent), in-
creased at a higher rate than the average wage in the economy. The pre-
mise is correct, but this does not entail a significant deviation from the
preceding analysis (which does not purport to be absolutely accurate).
The reason is quite simple. The real increase in the various components
of compensation not directly linked to the average wage does not exceed
(at least not significantly) the real increase in the average wage. The cost
of medical services (except dental treatment) increased 3.2 times in real
terms between 1977 and 2000.186 However, there are other components
of compensation whose aggregate weight is not less than that of compen-
sation for medical services, and the real cost of these components rose
185. This Figure and all related calculations are based on data collected by the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics. CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 53 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
ISR. tbl. 12.31 (2002), available at http://www.cbs.gov.illarchive/shnaton53/stl2_31.pdf;
CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTIcs, 47 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR. tbl. 12.24 (1996), availa-
ble at http://www.cbs.gov.illarchive/shnaton47/stl2-24.gif.




negligibly (dental treatment), did not change at all (non-economic loss),
or even decreased (medications, medical equipment, travel and mobility
costs). Even under assumptions favorable to the insurance companies,
weighting the real changes in various components of compensation not
directly related to the average wage, each according to the component's
relative weight in the overall compensation, does not produce a result
significantly higher than 1.6.187 And even if the result of this weighting is
slightly higher than the real change in average wage, the difference has a
negligible impact on the average compensation per victim (c) because of
the dominance of the wage-dependent components in overall
compensation.
The last variable in the equation, and the only one actually regulated
under RAVCA, is premium rates (p). As explained above, premium
rates were the product of intensive and effective pressure applied by the
insurance companies. Thus far, it is clear that during the relevant period,
the number of motor vehicles in Israel (i) increased by a factor of 4.23,
the number of victims (n) increased by a factor of 1.93, and the average
compensation per victim (c), at the very most, increased by a factor of 1.5.
In terms of proper policy, the regulator should have fixed premium rates
according to the formula dylr>19775 dl977. 188 Put differently, given the "so-
cial" nature of the scheme, insurance companies' profits should not have
been allowed to soar. Under this working assumption, the average pre-
mium rate (p) should have decreased by 30% (in real terms) by the end
of 2000.189 This should have been so a fortiori because Amendment No. 8
187. 1 tested this argument in three stages. First, I calculated the real increase in the
various components of compensation not directly linked to the average wage (except for
non-economic damages, where the real increase is 0). The nominal increases in the prices
of products and services that economic damages cover were taken from the Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics. CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 52 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR.
tbls. 13.4-13.5 (2001); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 47 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR.
tbls. 10.3-10.4 (1996); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 41 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF ISR.
tbis. 10.3-10.4 (1990); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 42 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR.
tbls. 10.3-10.4 (1991); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 37 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR.
tbls. J.3-J.4 (1986); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 36 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR. tbls.
J.3-J.4 (1985); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 31 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR. tbls. J.3-
J.4 (1980); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 29 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR. tbls. J.3-J.4
(1978); CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 28 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISR. tbls. J.3-J.4
(1977). The prices were compared with late-1976 prices, and the nominal change was con-
verted to real change based on changes in the consumer price index. Second, I examined
the relative weight of each non-wage-related component in the overall compensation based
on a random sample of court decisions. The third stage weighted the real changes in non-
wage-related components, each according to the component's relative weight in the overall
compensation.
188. d, denotes i, *p, - n, c, where n, is the number of eligible victims in year y; c, is
the average rate of compensation paid to a victim in year y; iy is the number of the insured
in year y; and p, is the average premium paid in year y.
189. Proof: We assume that i2000 p2000 - 2000* c2000 ! 1977 17* p - n .* Therefore
4.23 * inn * X * p1om - 1.93 * nan* 1.5 * cim 5 ian * pig - n9n * c1m (where X is the
maximum real increase in premium rates that conforms to the assumption). So X 5 (iian *
Pa-n + 1.895 * naim * cafn) / 4.23 * i9n * pm. Assuming that ivn * PIyn nm977 * c1 n, we




reduced the number of victims entitled to compensation under RAVCA
(n).
Nonetheless, systematic examination of the orders and regulations es-
tablishing mandatory auto insurance premiums reveals a radically differ-
ent picture. Instead of going down, premium rates steadily went up (in
real terms), as depicted in Figure 4.19 The choice of the 1980 premium
rates as the benchmark requires explanation. As mentioned above, a 1978
amendment to RAVCA provided that damages for loss of earnings and
earning capacity would be determined in accordance with the.victim's af-
ter-tax income, subject to a 25% tax deduction limitation.191 This amend-
ment significantly altered the average compensation (c) and naturally had
an impact on premium rates (p). Thus, "crude" premium rates set before
the amendment could not serve as a benchmark for examining the real
change in premium rates over the years. Absent clear data on the
amendment's distinct influence on premium rates (given other relevant
variables), reliance was placed on premium rates determined after the
amendment as the benchmark. Arguably, the real change in premium
rates between 1977 and 1980 closely reflects the decrease in damages for
loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity in the wake of the amend-
ment. So adopting the 1980 premium rates as the basis for comparison
does not effectively detract from the accuracy of the findings.192
190. This Figure and all related calculations are based on numerous Orders and Regula-
tions issued from time to time, all bearing a similar title: Road Accident Victims Compen-
sation Order (Premium Rates) (between 1977 and 1993) or Road Accident Victims
Compensation Regulations (Premium Rates) (between 1997 and 2000). These were pub-
lished in (<year>, <series> <volume>, <first page>): 2000, KT 6050, 824; 1999, KT 5984,
984; 1998, KT 5917, 1098; 1997, KT 5866, 140; 1993, KT 5540, 1068; 1990, KT 5318, 365;
1989, KT 5212, 1274; 1988, KT 5135, 18; 1987, KT 5020, 718; 1985, KT 4888, 326; 1985, KT
4744, 470; 1983, KT 4548, 333; 1982, KT 4407, 1663; 1980, KT 4158, 2292; 1977, KT 3674,
1120. All orders and regulations are linked to the fixed rates of the consumer price index,
so the real increase between two consecutive orders was 0.
191. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
192. Road Accident Victims Compensation Order (Premium Rates), 1980, KT 4158,
2292 was the first to adjust premium rates following the 1978 amendment. So there was no
real reduction in premium rates between 1978 and 1980, despite the amendment.
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FIGURE 4. RATIO OF AVERAGE PREMIUM IN A GIVEN
YEAR TO AVERAGE PREMIUM IN 1980 (IN REAL TERMS
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The Figure shows that despite the expectation of a gradual real reduc-
tion in premium rates, they actually increased-in real terms-by a factor
of 1.86 (or by a factor of 4 in dollar terms) by the end of 2000. Further-
more, between 1993 and 1998, prior to the commencement of the
mandatory insurance premiums reform of 2000 (further explained be-
low), premium rates were 2.3-2.4 times higher (in real terms) than the
rates of 1980. Undoubtedly, the substantial increase in premium rates
over the years was the result of aggressive lobbying by the insurance com-
panies.193 Combining forces, they managed to secure an incredible cash
flow for themselves. An expert opinion prepared for Israel's Association
for Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance, Ltd. (AVNER) at the beginning of
2003 reveals that the mandatory auto insurance branch raked in a positive
cumulative cash flow of NIS 17.5 billion between 1976 and 2000 (in late
2002 terms, including "special collection for past losses" and investment
profits).194
This depressing picture (from the public's perspective) was supposed to
change at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the summer of
1997, the Knesset enacted the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Insurance
Under Conditions of Supervised Competition and Arrangements for the
193. See, e.g., Benny Barak, Mandatory Insurance: Reform?, YNET, June 25, 2002, http:/
/www.ynet.co.illarticles/1,7340,L-1961559,00.html.
194. See generally Memorandum from Yehuda Kahana, supra note 56. The insurance
companies contended that they accumulated substantial actuarial deficits. But given the
nature of actuarial valuations, the numbers were probably inflated. Perry, supra note 33, at
218-19 n.294.
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Transition Period) (hereinafter the Insurance Act). 195 The goal of the
Insurance Act was "to prescribe that insurers engaged in auto insurance
will operate, upon the termination of the transition period, under condi-
tions of supervised competition." 9 6 The Insurance Act provided, inter
alia, that section 17 of RAVCA would be abolished as of March 31,
2001,197 and that AVNER's participation in victims' compensation would
be gradually reduced until it was totally eliminated with respect to victims
covered under policies issued as of January 1, 2003.198 Presumably, the
insurance companies were extremely wary of the transition from operat-
ing as a (legally sanctioned!) cartel to nearly free competition. So it
comes as no surprise that their representatives (together with the repre-
sentatives of AVNER, which was doomed to dissolution) made every ef-
fort to prevent, or at least delay, the reform.199 The insurance companies
failed to prevent the passage of the Insurance Act, but as a result of the
protracted negotiations they conducted with the Supervision of Insurance
Department of the Ministry of Finance, the Knesset ultimately agreed to
extend the transition period and established additional stages on the way
to completing the reform.200
Ironically, the "supervised competition" did not impair insurance com-
panies' profitability for several years. During the first stage (April 1,
2001-December 31, 2002), premiums were determined in accordance
with the Supervision of Insurance Business Regulations (Premiums that
an Insurer is Permitted to Collect for the Insurance of a Motor Vehicle)
(Temporary Provision).201 Each insurer was permitted to determine the
premium for each insured within a range of 90%-110% of the sums speci-
fied in the supplement to the regulations. For most of the insured, the
base sums (including the transfer to Karnit) were higher in real terms
than the sums collected previously. Needless to say, the insurance com-
panies made almost no use of the possibility of charging sums that were
195. Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Insurance Under Conditions of Supervised Compe-
tition and Arrangements for the Transition Period), 1997, S.H. 205.
196. Id. § 1.
197. Id. §§ 10, 16; see also supra note 175.
198. Id. §H 4, 10B. In the past, AVNER received 70% of the premiums and paid 70% of
the compensation.
199. These pressures were mentioned by MK Meir Shitrit, the Minister of Finance in
1999. See DK (1998-99) 849-50; DK (1999-2000) 2723; DK (2000-01) 1653-54; DK (1999-
2000) 2720 (statement of MK David Tal); DK (1989-99) 845-46 (statement of MK Nissim
Dahan).
200. See Motor Vehicle Insurance Bill (Insurance Under Conditions of Supervised
Competition and Arrangements for the Transition Period) (Amendment No. 2), 2000, HH,
299 (introductory notes); DK (2000-01) 1647 (statement of the Minister of Finance,
Avraham Shocaht). The agreement between The Ministry of Finance and the insurance
companies was concluded on November 13, 2000. See Ministry of Finance, Document of
Understanding (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://ozar.mof.gov.il/hon/2001/insurance/
memos/2002/DOU.pdf.
201. 2001, KT 6091, 514. These regulations were issued under section 37(a)(1) of the




lower than the base sums. 2 0 2
During the second stage (beginning January 1, 2003), the insurance
companies began to determine premium rates independently in accor-
dance with a few guidelines issued by the Superintendent of Insurance 2O3
and subject to his approval. Currently, most companies utilize a
database, established for statistical evaluation of risks in the auto-insur-
ance business, based on diverse variables. 204 Insurance companies are
permitted to take into account a relatively limited number of variables
that relate to the characteristics of the motor vehicle and its drivers, 205
but the list may be expanded in coming years.206 At this stage, competi-
tion should have reduced mandatory insurance premiums. But a sample
taken in the summer of 2003 showed that, for a considerable number of
the insured, the transition to competition did not immediately lead to a
real reduction in insurance premiums, as compared with the standard pre-
miums set by the regulator in the summers of 2000 and 1999.207 It was
quite the opposite: there was a significant rise in premiums paid by own-
ers of motor vehicles with small and medium engine capacity (up to 1,500
cc). 2 0 8 Moreover, mounting numbers of insureds (primarily motorcycle
owners and dangerous drivers) were instructed to purchase insurance
from "The Pool," a residual mechanism that sells insurance at high rates
to motor vehicle users who cannot obtain coverage from insurance com-
panies at standard rates. 209 So even if there was a slight reduction in
202. See Barak, supra note 193; Benny Barak, The Reform Has Failed: Mandatory In-
surance Rates Rose 5%, YNET, Feb. 19, 2002, http://www.ynet.co.illarticles/1,7340,L-16771
48,00.html.
203. See Ministry of Finance, Circular No. 2003/6, Insurance Rates in the Mandatory
Auto Insurance Branch (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/hon/2001/insur-
ance/memos/2003-6.doc.
204. Motor Vehicle Insurance Ordinance [New Version], 1970, N.H. 320, § 11A.
205. The variables included are the vehicle's engine capacity; the presence of air bags;
the youngest driver's age, gender, and years of experience as a licensed driver; the number
of claims by all drivers of the vehicle during the last three years; and the number of suspen-
sions or revocations of those drivers' licenses during the last three years. See Ministry of
Finance, Parameters that Insurance Companies Use to Determine Mandatory Insurance
Rates (July 3, 2006), available at http://ozar.mof.gov.illhon/2001/insurance/memos/4_35
param2006-7.pdf [hereinafter Ministry of Finance, Parameters that Insurance Companies
Use].
206. The database also contains data about the type of motor vehicle, the manufacturer,
year of production, expected use of the vehicle (for example, freight transport, public
transportation, leasing, or driver's education). See Motor Vehicle Insurance Regulations
(Establishment and Operation of Databases), 2004, KT 6310, 242.
207. See Ministry of Finance, Parameters that Insurance Companies Use, supra note
205.
208. Id. In this sense, the reform was anti-social: owners of larger, and hence more
expensive, vehicles paid less than before (because the drivers and passengers are exposed
to relatively smaller risks), and owners of smaller vehicles paid more than before. See
Shilo, supra note 16, at 6.
209. Motor Vehicle Insurance Regulations (Residual Insurance and the Method for De-
termining the Rate), 2001, KT 6111, 873. This phenomenon is well known in the United
States. See LITAN, supra note 3, at 10, 12 ("By artificially restraining premiums, state pre-
mium controls have caused many more higher-risk drivers in states where these controls
are present to obtain their insurance from so-called 'residual risk' markets or plans because
insurers cannot profitably sell insurance to these drivers at the controlled premiums.").
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premiums paid by certain groups, it was at least partially offset by an
increase in premiums paid by other groups.
Insurance companies can now set premiums according to a rough esti-
mate of individual risk and refer more and more high-risk insureds to The
Pool. This enables insurance companies to maintain considerable profit
in the mandatory auto insurance branch. However, premiums have de-
creased significantly in recent years, 210 showing that competition ulti-
mately serves the social goal better than rate regulation.
IV. LESSONS FOR A FEDERAL SYSTEM
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the preceding analy-
sis is that the desirability of regulating the content of insurance contracts,
as opposed to solvency or antitrust regulation, is questionable. On the
one hand, regulation is a costly venture.211 It entails endless collection of
data, analysis, discussion, decision-making, and implementation. On the
other hand, as the Israeli experience shows, an attempt to control the
insurance market may be counterproductive. Absurdly, regulation may
catalyze and legitimize socially harmful cartelization. In trying to regu-
late insurance markets, the government reduces insurers' incentive to
compete and induces them to cooperate vis-i-vis the government itself to
the detriment of consumers. Before and after the Israeli reform, insur-
ance companies established a unified front and aggressively negotiated
both the nature and the particulars of the scheme with government and
parliamentary officials. They enjoyed considerable success. Policymak-
ers should be aware of the plain fact that regulation may be a costly and
counterproductive enterprise. Policymakers should not avoid regulation
altogether, but must be cautious in their aspirations and efforts.
For instance, one view is "that insurance rates must be subject to over-
sight, if not outright control, to protect consumers." 212 In the past, "con-
cern over collusion in the insurance industry was well founded."213 The
primary instance of collusion in the United States occurred during the
1930s, when insurers operated as a cartel.214 This led to the South-East-
ern Underwriters case, in which the appellees were indicted under the
Sherman Act for fixing and maintaining arbitrary and non-competitive
premium rates on fire and other lines of insurance in several states.215
The idea that rate regulation is necessary to prevent cartelization is no
longer valid. On the contrary, as argued above, rate regulation may gen-
erate a different, but equally harmful, type of cartelization that leads to
210. See Ministry of Finance, Parameters that Insurance Companies Use, supra note
205 (reporting a reduction of more than 20% between 2003 and late-2005).
211. See, e.g., John Bernhardt, Note, Is National Gas Pipeline Regulation Worth the
Fuss?, 40 STAN. L. REV. 753, 762, 770 (1988) (explaining that regulation is costly).
212. See LrrAN, supra note 3, at 12.
213. See Cummins, supra note 10, at 6.
214. Id.




excessive prices. 216 This Article thus provides additional empirical sup-
port for deregulation of premium rates. In Israel, just as in California,
strict control over auto insurance premiums curtailed rate reduction de-
spite the decline in claim costs; 2 17 and just as in New Jersey and South
Carolina, the move away from strict price controls has actually benefited
consumers. 218
Israeli experience is clearly relevant for American policymakers. First,
the Israeli economy is comparable to an average U.S. state economy in
size, structure, and political environment. Israel is an advanced market
economy with a GDP of around $200 billion (akin to Connecticut or Lou-
isiana) and a GDP per capita of nearly $30,000 (like Utah or West Vir-
ginia). Israel is a parliamentary democracy with three main branches of
government: the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The first two
have been subject to lobbyism for decades, albeit probably less institu-
tionalized than in the United States through the surveyed period. More
specifically, the Israeli insurance regulatory system is similar to that of a
typical U.S. state. The legislature directly controls several aspects of in-
surers' activities, including the limits of their liability. Other aspects are
controlled by government agencies and officials. For example, an insur-
ance commissioner oversees insurers' solvency, approves insurance
forms, supervises insurers' conduct to protect consumers from unscrupu-
lous practices, oversees the activities of insurance agents, and approves
insurance premium rates.219 Second, cumulative evidence from numer-
ous jurisdictions shows that the Israeli experience is not unique. Presum-
ably, insurance companies operate as an interest group in all western
countries, and make similar achievements. 220 So the above analysis only
lends additional support to general arguments that are applicable to vari-
ous jurisdictions.
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that a local insurance lobby can
exercise considerable influence on a single state government and has
216. Regulation may also cause other economic distortions, such as cross-subsidization
and rate-suppression. See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 10, at 12-13. These distortions, how-
ever, are beyond the scope of this Article.
217. See id. at 13 ("There is evidence that premiums in California, for example, would
have fallen significantly during the 1990s had California retained competitive rating rather
than adopting prior approval."). California had a different regulatory system, which was
based on prior rate approval rather than rate-fixing by the regulator. See id. Cummins
notes that "prices in regulated states are likely to include a charge for regulatory risk that is
not present in competitive markets." Id.
218. See LITAN, supra note 3, at 12.
219. Id. at 9 (presenting the roles of an insurance commissioner in the United States).
220. See, e.g., Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the
Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (discussing the insur-
ance lobby's impact on tort reform in Ohio); Katherine M. Jones, Law, Politics, and the
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Case of Insurance Regulation and the Commerce
Clause, 1938-1948, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 391 (2004) ("A cynical view would suggest that
the course of insurance regulation was largely determined by the exceptional strength of
the well-organized and financed insurance lobby."); Charlene Davis Luke, Beating the
"Wrap": The Agency Effort to Control Wraparound Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX.
REV. 129, 142 (2005) ("The insurance lobby is powerful.").
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urged policymakers to take this into account. The foregoing analysis can
be taken one step further to develop an additional theoretical justifica-
tion for federal regulation of the American insurance market. 221 Assum-
ing that regulation is the product of bargaining between the government
and interest groups, the ability to realize specific goals through regulation
depends on the relative power of regulators, on the one hand, and the
regulated industry, on the other. In this respect, the United States differs
significantly from Israel.
First, in a federal system of government, state-based regulation enables
insurance companies to effectively implement a "divide and rule" strat-
egy. They can use their combined power to negotiate the terms of regula-
tion with one state legislature or agency at a time. In this respect, each
state is analogous to Israel: it endures similar pressures and is likely to
make similar concessions. The federal government is much more power-
ful than discrete state governments. 222 Hence, associations and represen-
tative organizations of insurance companies, like other interest groups,
have much greater leverage over state governments than they have over
the federal government.
Second, and closely related, insurance companies can utilize not only
the relative weakness of state governments (as compared with the federal
government), but also interstate competition for investment and business
activity. A state-based system triggers a race to the bottom. Insurance
companies can reduce their investment and business activity in states that
implement more rigorous regulation and extend their activities in states
that adopt more lenient regulatory schemes. In this way, insurance com-
panies encourage specific states to gradually reduce state intervention in
the insurance market. Federal regulation diminishes the viability of this
strategy.
Third, as opposed to local interest groups, insurance companies in the
United States frequently operate on the national level and are organized
on that level.2 2 3 Consequently, any lessons taught by the Israeli experi-
ence arguably apply a fortiori to state regulation in the United States.
While the relative power of a single state government equals, on average,
that of the Israeli government in its regulatory attempts, the Israeli gov-
ernment only faced pressures by representatives of local companies, not
by national associations of multi-state colossi.
221. For the traditional justifications, see LITAN, supra note 3, at 10-11 (discussing expe-
ditious approvals of policy changes and new products, preemption of state regulation of
rates, attracting sophisticated expertise, and more efficiently spreading the costs of
regulation).
222. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the
New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 595, 648 (2003).
223. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944) (ob-
serving that the insurance business "is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compart-
ments which function in isolation from each other" and that "[i]nterrelationship,
interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in which they operate are




The financial crisis has exposed some of the main flaws in existing regu-
latory systems, and rekindled the debate on the importance and scope of
regulation of the financial system. Insurance merits special attention, be-
cause it is the only financial industry not regulated on the federal level.
This Article proposes a fresh viewpoint on the inherent weakness of regu-
lation at the state level: an interest-group theory with a strong compara-
tive bent. The state system of insurance regulation in the United States
makes the use of foreign experience extremely and incomparably valua-
ble because, in the absence of federal intervention, individual states oper-
ate much like small foreign economies. Israel serves as an excellent
example because it is analogous to an average U.S. state. In particular,
American scholars and policymakers can benefit considerably from the
history of the Israeli road accident victims compensation scheme, a thirty-
year experiment in governmental interaction with the insurance industry.
The official motive for the enactment of RAVCA in 1975 was social.
According to the traditional view, the Act was meant to guarantee a
prompt and proper remedy for all victims of road accidents. The legisla-
ture sought to achieve this goal through a threefold reform. It imposed
absolute liability on any person using a motor vehicle for personal inju-
ries caused to others in a road accident in which the vehicle was involved;
it expanded mandatory insurance to cover any liability under RAVCA
itself, and any personal injury that a driver might suffer while using the
vehicle; and it established "Karnit," which compensates accident victims
who are entitled to compensation under the Act but cannot recover from
an insurance company.
Unfortunately, the government played a secondary role in the imple-
mentation of the social initiative. Before and after the initial reform, in-
surance companies established a unified front and energetically
negotiated the terms of the scheme with government and parliamentary
officials. They have done so continuously and successfully for decades.
The greatest achievement of the insurance lobby seems to be the govern-
ment's bewildering decision to withdraw the original plan to nationalize
compensation for road accident victims (as actually happened in the sis-
ter-jurisdiction of New Zealand).
Next, the insurance companies persuaded the legislature to restrict and
gradually reduce mandatory auto insurance coverage. The Act subjected
both economic and non-economic damages to rigid caps that had not pre-
viously existed, and victims were deprived of their traditional rights of
action in torts. Shortly after the Act came into force, it was amended so
that compensation for loss of earnings and earning capacity would be de-
termined in accordance with the victim's after-tax income. The right to
receive interim (immediate) payments was much flimsier than originally
intended. The courts' power to award periodic payments was restricted,
and insurance companies were empowered to apply for such payments
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irrespective of victims' will or interest. Finally, Amendment No. 8 ex-
cluded liability in various cases on questionable grounds.
At the same time, insurance companies dermianded and obtained offi-
cial standing in the premium-setting process and exerted continuous and
unrelenting pressure on the government to raise premium rates. Pre-
mium rates rose significantly without any true economic justification. Fol-
lowing a revolutionary amendment which took full effect only in January
2003, regulated competition began in the mandatory auto insurance mar-
ket. The steep reduction in premium rates in subsequent years shows how
inflated the regulated rates were.
The primary conclusion from this analysis is that the desirability of reg-
ulating the content of insurance contracts, as opposed to solvency or anti-
trust regulation, is questionable. Policymakers should be aware of the
simple fact that regulation may be a costly yet counterproductive enter-
prise. They should not avoid regulation altogether, but must be cautious
in their aspirations and efforts. Moreover, these initial findings suggest
an additional theoretical justification for a shift to federal regulation of
the U.S. insurance market. Assuming that regulation is the product of
bargaining between the government and interest groups, the ability to
realize specific goals through regulation depends on the relative power of
regulators, on the one hand, and the regulated industry, on the other. A
U.S. state government is comparable to the Israeli government in the
sense that it is weaker than the federal government in its interaction with
the insurance lobby. In a way, a state government is even weaker than
the Israeli government because it has to compete with sister states for
national insurers' investment and business activity. At the same time, a
U.S. state faces a much stronger adversary than the Israeli government,
namely nationwide conglomerates rather than local companies. The fed-
eral government is better equipped to withstand the pressure.
This Article does not purport to provide conclusive answers. It merely
endeavors to advance the ongoing debate over insurance regulation in
America by offering a fresh, unconventional viewpoint on an extremely
complex and highly controversial subject.
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